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Abstract
This thesis is about checking code for a graph-reduction machine computing by
template instantiation. An equation-based static checking method for low-level
code is proposed in this thesis. The checking can be performed without requir-
ing any extra code annotations. Most ill-behaved programs can be rejected and
most well-behaved programs can be accepted. The template code has no explicit
information about data types but the static checker works by inferring low-level
recursive types. We show compatibility between high-level and low-level type sys-
tems. We evaluate empirically the effectiveness of checking to prevent failures. We
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In this thesis we are interested in the application of static checking techniques to
low-level code such as Reduceron template code [1]. The Reduceron is a graph
reduction machine that uses template instantiation model [2, 3], which can run
on reconfigurable hardware called FPGAs to exploit the advantage of parallel
computations.
Our work is not program verification, because we do not try to attest that a
program produces the correct result. In addition, we are not using disassembling
techniques to obtain and check a source-level representation.
The importance of low-level code verification is discussed in Clutterbuck’s [4] work
and also in Proof-Carrying Code [5], and Typed Assembly Language TAL [6].
More recently, and more similar to our approach, are the type-inference systems
described in [7] and [8]. The scope of the techniques presented in this thesis is not
limited to the static checking of template code for Reduceron. Similar methods
might be applied to other forms of byte-code or compiled-code.
During the compilation process, F-lite code is transformed to equivalent template
code (See §2 [1]). A well-established compiler might be trusted to produce safe
code. However, template code could be modified at some stage after compilation
and before execution, or template code might be supplied from some other source.
Faulty code could produce a failure at run-time such as an invalid memory access.
1
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Our idea to is protect the Reduceron code against such failures by examination of
the low-level code of the Reduceron. Taking the ideas of PCC [5] and TAL [6, 9]
in which mobile code is verified before its execution, we investigate here how to
build a type-checking system to guard against unsafe template code such as code
modified inappropriately by hand, or code intercepted and altered before it reaches
the target machine. Unlike [7] and [8], we do not use any extra annotations but
infer types directly from template code.
1.2 Thesis Statement
Here we present the claims for our thesis.
1. Type-Checking methods can be used as the basis of a static checker for low-
level code such as Reduceron template code. The checking can be performed
without requiring any extra code annotations.
2. In experimental tests using mutated programs most ill-behaved programs
can be rejected and most well-behaved programs can be accepted.
3. The low-level types inferred during static checking of typeless template code
can be shown compatible with translated high-level types in source programs.
4. Checking can be made efficient in the following sense : the time and space
complexity can be reduced by translating the model into an implementation,
giving the first step towards further optimisations.
1.3 Thesis Rationale
• Type-Checking methods can be used as the basis of a static checker for low-
level code such as Reduceron template code. In the high-level source, several
static methods can be used to prove with rigour that source program sat-
isfies some requirements. However, the problem arises when the compiled
code is sent to the code consumer by using an unreliable channel. Who
can tell us that the code will respect the invariants of the high-level speci-
fication? We can choose a complex method to check the template code, for
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instance requiring a certificate from the code producer guaranteeing that the
code comes from a trusted producer. This approach depends on the code
producer and moreover, it only attests that the program is provided from a
trusted source, but not that the code is well-behaved. By type-checking the
template code we can catch type errors before the template code is executed.
This method provides a feasible way to check if some template code is well-
behaved. However the type inference for low-level code is a challenging task,
at low-level for instance there is much less information for algebraic data
types than its high-level representation. Although we have decided to start
with a type-checker there are other static checking methods based on data
flow analysis [10, 11] which can be combined with type-checking. We refer
the reader to Chapter 2 in [12] for further details in verification techniques
for low-level code.
The checking can be performed without requiring any extra code annotations.
Although no explicit type information is provided in the low-level code, it is
feasible and possible to infer type information. Here, it is important to note
that our work is focused on low-level code without any extra information.
The opposite approach to our work is in [13–16], where the source-level code
is checked or verified by using extra information.
• Most ill-behaved programs can be rejected and most well-behaved programs
can be accepted. Taking as basis the statement of Milner : “Well-typed
programs cannot go wrong“ [17] , we can measure the effectiveness of the type
checking by comparing the static checking and the operational semantics.
Ideally, the well-behaved programs are well-typed and the ill-behaved are ill-
typed. In Chapter 4 we measure the extent to which this ideal is achieved.
• The low-level types inferred during static checking of typeless template code
can be shown compatible with translated high-level types in source programs.
The type compatibility between the high-level and the low-level type systems
is expressed in the properties of the solutions for the system of equations in
both systems.
• Checking can be made efficient in the following sense : the time and space
complexity can be reduced by translating the model into an implementation,
giving the first step towards further optimisations. As a starting point we
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could take advantage of the single-threaded data structures in the imple-
mentation to have a gain in the efficiency and in the reduction of the costs
of memory.
1.4 Contributions
The main contribution is the use of type-checking methods to check statically low-
level code, and prevent the occurrence of run-time failures. In addition, this static
checking can be efficient, using a minimal amount of resources in the run-time
system. Our contributions are:
• To avoid the need for dependent types, as used in some other static checkers
for low-level code [7, 8], we apply a primitive analysis before the type infer-
ence phase. We call this analysis PrimCheck, and it eliminates the primitive
applications from template code. The details are in Chapter 4 §4.3.
• Our second contribution is the way of viewing the type inference problem
as a problem of solving a system of equations [18]. We can extract the
type information from untyped compiled code such as Reduceron template
code. In §4.4.4 of Chapter 4 we explain this idea. We combine the ideas of
Cardelli’s and Colmerauer’s work in [18, 19].
• We evaluate empirically the effectiveness of checking to prevent failures.
• We show compatibility between high-level and low-level type systems.
• We investigate the low-level implementation of the static checker and how it
can be made efficient.
1.5 Roadmap
In Chapter 2 we give a general background of some of the static checking techniques
for low-level code. We start the discussion with type checking and type inference
approaches [18, 20], we continue with Java byte-code verification [21–25], and we
end with Proof-Carrying Code [5] and related techniques [6, 26–32].
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In Chapter 3 we give a description of a framework for testing, constructing a tool
set to measure empirically the effectiveness of the static methods proposed in this
thesis. We start with the description of the Reduceron machine, then we follow
with the approach of mutating [33] the programs to be measured. Finally, we
explain how we classify the results of our experiments.
In Chapter 4 we describe a type inference system for Reduceron code. Without
using any extra information, we derive a system of type equations from Reduceron
template code. We call this model Tyre-Check. We split the static checking into
three phases which are described in the following order:
• AtomCheck, is a sanity check for template code.
• PrimCheck, a primitive analysis to eliminate the application of primitives.
• TyreCheck, the actual type inference.
In addition, by using mutated programs we evaluate empirically the effectiveness
of checking to prevent failures.
In Chapter 5 we investigate the type-compatibility between a high-level type sys-
tem for F-lite source program and the low-level type system for Reduceron code.
Here, we describe the main parts of the type system for F-lite, then we explain the
main points of the translation from high-level types to low-level type-terms equa-
tions. Finally, we show empirically that inferred low-level types are compatible
with translated high-level types.
In Chapter 6 we explore issues of efficiency. In particular, we give an implementa-
tion in C language for the Haskell model. We give the description for the Haskell
model –TyreCheckH, then we measure the time and complexity of this model.
Then we explain the main points of the translation from our Haskell model to the
C implementation – TyreCheckC0. We measure the TyreCheckC0 in terms of time
and space to detect the components of the checker requiring the greatest memory
allocation and the most time-consuming functions. Finally, we give an improved
version of our C implementation which we call TyreCheckC1.




The purpose of this Chapter is to give a general idea of the static checking and
verification techniques. As our work is based on static checking and not verification
(eg. program correctness), we explore the related techniques to static checking in
more detail.
In §2.1 we give a brief background of the verification and checking of low-level
code. In §2.2 we explore the literature related to types. In §2.3 the verification
and checking of byte code is explored. In §2.4 we give general descriptions of
Proof-carrying Code, Typed Assembly Language and related techniques. Finally,
in §2.5 we give a summary of the techniques presented in this chapter.
2.1 Introduction
The program verification problem is not a new topic in Computer Science. This
problem has been studied by some well-known computer scientists (Floyd, Hoare et
al) [34–37] in the 60’s and 70’s, giving the foundations for research in this area for
high-level code. Even if those techniques were originally conceived for high-level
code, they could be applied to verify and check low-level code.
Late in the 80s Clutterbuck and Carre´ pointed out the importance of the verifica-
tion of low-level code [4]. Nowadays, it seems to be important to verify low-level
code due to the ubiquity of software. The massive networks in which code is in
the form of binaries are a jungle where the code can be trapped and modified
maliciously. Another application of the low-level verification is when we need
6
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to perform some hand-coded optimisations in installed software: in the scenario
where the raw code does not contain information or a mechanism to prevent the
introduction of erroneous code. We cannot know if the code is safe according to the
high-level specifications. More recently the problem of low-evel code verification
has been studied by Myreen and Gordon [38, 39].
In this review we explore some related techniques for static verification of mobile
code. For our purposes, mobile code is defined as a piece of code produced by a
different computer or compiler (e.g., untrusted code producer) from the computer
where the code is going to be executed (e.g., host machine).
In general, the mobile code is transported as assembly code or bytecode from one
agent to another over an unreliable network. It is executed by the run-time system
in the host computer. Some of the techniques described here, have in common
that the hard part of the verification process is done by the code producer, at
compilation time. Then the code consumer at loading time checks the untrusted
code by using a light-weight verification algorithm. This checking guarantees the
code is well-behaved according to the safety policies of the host run-time system.
The spectrum of low level-code is broad, it can include bytecode, assembly code
or machine code. For our work, we use these three models of low-level code
interchangeably.
2.2 Type Systems
One discipline that addresses program static verification in a formal way is type
systems [18, 20, 40]. Type systems can be used at high-level as well as in low-
level code. This discipline guarantees at compile time that programs will not fail
because of typing conflicts during the execution of the program. Informally, one
view of a type system is a system to prevent the occurrence of execution errors in
a program at run-time [18].
One of the first computer languages that had a type system was FORTRAN [20],
establishing distinctions between floating-point and integer numbers. The study
of type systems has passed from an informal discipline to a formal discipline.
According to Cardelli [18], type systems should be:
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• Checkable. By using a decidable algorithm (called type-checking), the pro-
grammer can verify that a given program is well-behaved. If checking fails,
the programmer catches possible errors before they happen.
• Transparent. The type system will report an evident reason for the fault, in
case of a type-check error in the program.
• Enforceable. The type declarations, and the associated programs or func-
tions, should be routinely verified.
2.2.1 Type-Checking and Type-Inference
There are two techniques that implement a type system. Type-checking attests
that the type information explicitly given by the programmer is consistent with
the language definition constraints. On the other hand, type-inference algorithms
calculate the type information without any extra type signatures, they use an
inference system to determine the type compatibility between expressions. We
could have the combination of both algorithms, if we provide some hints to make
the inference or the checking fast. In our work we use the type-inference technique.
The type-checking and type-inference algorithms are core components for the im-
plementation of a type system. One type system can be implemented by several
type-checking or type-inference algorithms. Such algorithms verify or infer that
the operations in functions correspond to their type abstractions. They can check,
for example, that a sum operation is performed only over numeric values; or they
can guarantee that a concatenation of a list and a pair is not performed. Type-
checking is part of the compilation stage, and in its origin, it was conceived to work
with high-level representations of computer languages. Possible errors related to
a mismatch in types can be detected before the program is running. According
to Milner, an important design goal for the systems is that if the program code
respects the typing rules imposed in the type system, then the program “will not
go wrong” [17] during execution time.
If some type information is provided then the type-checker will detect if there are
inconsistencies between the provided signature and the inferred types. We may
view type checkers as theorem provers but offering more information if an error
occurs during the rule derivation.
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2.2.2 Polymorphism
The main idea of parametric polymorphism [41] is that we can define generic
functions to avoid the expansion of the size in a given program. For instance,
consider a function to compute the addition of two numbers. We can define several
functions to deal with integers and real numbers. By using polymorphism, we can
write one function with generic parameters that allow the inclusion of integer and
real parameters.
One of the basic principles in type systems with polymorphic types is the idea of
unification. This algorithm decides if a pair of type expressions are compatible.
By unifying pairs of type expressions we can get the most general unifier [42].
More precisely, a finite mapping from type variables to types. The connection
between Robinson’s unification algorithm [42] and polymorphic type systems was
discovered by Milner [17].
The idea behind type-inference is to reconstruct the types of the expressions. It
can be viewed as a two stage process. In the first stage, the primitive types (of the
abstract syntax tree) of an expression are introduced. In this part of the process
the unknown types for the expressions are labelled as new variables. In the second
stage, the types for the unknown types are reconstructed or calculated using type-
inference rules. This last part involves the unification of the equation types in
order to get the most general type. The typing rules are applied recursively to the
abstract syntax tree. At the end of the process (if it terminates), we obtain from
the context the types for every single expression in the program.
Most modern functional languages make extensive use of types [43–45]. By us-
ing strong type systems in functional programming we can generate type-safe
components of software. For example by using type signatures in functions the
programmer can catch type errors at compile time, thus improving the produc-
tivity of the software development process. In addition, type signature provides a
good way of documenting the code [20]. The lack of side-effects in the declarative
style provides a strong mechanism to construct programs and reason about their
properties. Moreover the size of the programs can be drastically reduced by using
higher-order functions and lazy evaluation [46]. Pierce and Cardelli’s work pro-
vides a full and deep coverage of type systems and their relation to programming
languages [18, 20].
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2.2.3 An Example of Type Inference
In Figure 2.1 we have the length function defined as two pattern matching defini-
tions in 2.1 and 2.2. In the remaining part of the Figure 2.1 we depict briefly the
type equations to infer the type for length function. Before we proceed with the
type equations explanation, we recall that the type of length is [a] → Int. That is,
a function that takes a polymorphic list of type [a], and returns the length, which
is of type Int.
Now we describe the type equations informally, and how we can discover the type
information. To start, we introduce an equation to denote the type of length in
Equation 2.3. At this moment we only know that a function length is a function
with type a → b, from type a to another type b. In the same way we establish the
type equations in 2.4 and 2.5 for the two pattern matching definitions of length.
From the argument of definition 2.4, we discover that the type variable a0 is a
list of some type a2, we denote this in Equation 2.6. From the right hand side
of 2.4 we can see that the type of b0 is Int, and we denote it on Equation 2.7.
For the second definition 2.5, we extract the type of the argument, we discover
that the type variable a1 is a list of some type a3, we denote this in Equation 2.8.
The most interesting part is in the right hand side of 2.5. There are two function
applications, the first one is the function (+) applied to two arguments of type
Int in Equation 2.9, the first argument is the numeric constant which is of type
Int. The second argument is the application of the function length itself to the
remaining list xs, we introduce a new type variable b2, and we add the constraint
that it must be of type Int in Equation 2.10. Apart from that, the variable b2
must be equal to the application of length to the remaining list denoted in type
[a3], that is denoted in Equation 2.11. In Equation 2.11, notice the type of the
length function which is a copy and not an instance of length type. We need a
copy of the type because the type must be the same when we have a recursive
call. In Equation 2.11 we introduce a new type variable b3, which will be the type
result of that function application. The last equation is 2.13 and that constraint
l0=l1 guarantees that the two definitions are type compatible. Once we solve these
equations we obtain a system of equations, where the type of the length function
is denoted by Equations 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 11
Definition of length :
length[ ] = 0 (2.1)
length(x : xs) = (+) 1 (length xs) (2.2)
Type equations :
l = a→ b (2.3)
l0 = a0 → b0 (2.4)
l1 = a1 → b1 (2.5)
a0 = [a2] (2.6)
b0 = Int (2.7)
a1 = [a3] (2.8)
b1 = Int (2.9)
b2 = Int (2.10)
a→ b = [a3]→ b3 (2.11)
b3 = b2 (2.12)
l0 = l1 (2.13)
Solving type equations:
l = a→ b (2.14)
a = [a3] (2.15)
b = b3 (2.16)
b3 = Int (2.17)
Figure 2.1: Example of length function and its inferred type equations.
2.2.4 Recursive Types and Subtyping
Recursive definitions are present in most programming languages. For example
in functional programming languages such as ML or Haskell data structures like
trees or lists are instances of recursive types. In section 2.2.3 we saw that it is
possible to handle recursive type information by means of equations containing
recursive references in their subterms: we reuse the idea of Abadi’s and Cardelli’s
work stated in the following slogan: “Recursive types can hence be described by
equations, and we shall see that in fact they can be unambiguously defined by
equations.” [47].
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The problem of subtyping is a whole area, and it has been studied by Cardelli,
Mitchell et al [47–55].
2.3 Static Checking of bytecode
Much of the work on low-level verification of bytecode has been prompted by the
development of Java bytecode which is executed by the Java Virtual Machine
JVM [56, 57]. Probably this tendency is due to the popularity of Java and the use
of architecture-independent design. The same Java code should run everywhere
without changes. In addition to that, any language could potentially be compiled
to Java bytecode, allowing more flexibility for the programmer.
Java bytecode was designed to be portable and statically checked [58]. The pro-
liferation of many architectures forced the programming language community to
think how to write different code for each specific platform. The price of this
portability is the vulnerability of the host machine, as Java bytecode can be down-
loaded from an untrusted source. Hence the machine needs some mechanisms to
prevent ill-behaved programs. Gosling was inspired by the idea of bytecode from
UCSD Pascal which used a primitive bytecode called p-code and ran in a virtual
machine. “The solution we chose was to compile to a byte coded machine inde-
pendent instruction set that bears a certain resemblance to things like the UCSD
Pascal P-Code” [58].
Java bytecode is a sequence of opcodes. Some opcodes contain implicit type infor-
mation in the instructions. For example, in Figure 2.2 a small subset of instructions
is illustrated and denoted by instr. The opcode iload n is the instruction that
loads an int value n from a local variable, the opcode aload n loads a reference
from a register n onto the stack, the opcode astore n stores a reference into a
register, opcode iadd adds two ints from the top of the stack, the instruction goto
l jumps to another instruction in the set of instructions denoted by l, iconst n
loads the numeric constant n into the stack, and finally, the ifeq l opcode is a
conditional jump, if the local variable is zero then it jumps to the instruction at
label l.
Static analysis techniques for Java bytecode verification [25, 56] are well known
in the bytecode verification community. Model checking, abstract interpretation,
type-checking , or the combination of some of them, are the main methods used
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Figure 2.2: A small subset of Java bytecode instructions.
to deal with the problems of security in the JVM at load time. The first approach
to stop ill-typed programs was due to Cohen [23], who proposed dynamic checking
in a so-called defensive Java Virtual Machine (dJVM). Cohen used ACL2 [59] as
a language to specify and validate the model. However, in practice the cost of
checking at run-time was too high.
2.3.1 A Machine over Types
To alleviate the problems of dynamic-checking Java bytecode verification, some
ideas of static checking came in the 90s. The first implementation was an abstract
machine that uses data flow analysis (DFA) combined with type-checking, devel-
oped by Yellin and Gosling at Sun [58]. Basically, this abstract machine checks the
type information of every instruction in the code. It works over types instead of
concrete values. In addition to type-checking it makes pertinent checks to detect
possible underflow or overflow in the stack of type instructions and in the stack of
type registers.
The static checking of Java bytecode includes several stages in the work of Yellin
and Gosling, in this literature review we are only interested in two points: The
code is free of stack overflow and stack underflow, and It is type safe. The Java
bytecode is safe if the following constraints are true:
• The code is free of stack overflow and stack underflow.
• It is type safe.
• The program counter is in the scope of the method.
• The code has a valid register initialisation.
• It has the objects initialised before they are used.
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[[iconst n]] < S,R >⇒ < int : S,R >
where
S < MaxStackSize
[[astore n]] < t : S,R >⇒ < S,R[n\t] >
where
0 <= n < MaxRegSize ∧ t <: Obj
[[iadd]] < int : int : S,R >⇒ < int : S,R >
[[iload n]] < S,R >⇒ < int : S,R >
where
0 <= n < MaxRegSize ∧Rn = int ∧ |S| < MaxStackSize
[[istore n]] < int : S,R >⇒ < S,R[n\int] >
where
0 <= n < MaxRegSize
[[aload n]] < S,R >⇒ < Rn : S,R >
where
0 <= n < MaxRegSize ∧Rn <: Obj ∧ |S| < MaxStackSize
Figure 2.3: Example of abstract interpretation rules in Yellin and Gosling’s
static checker for Java bytecode.
The JVM is a stack machine in which the instructions are popped or pushed onto
the stack during execution. One way to verify that the code is safe, is to use a
model to approximate execution on a defensive dJVM. Here is where the abstract
interpretation machine enters into the scene. Instead of working over concrete
values it operates over types. Basically this method is a combination of data flow
analysis DFA and type-checking.
The abstract interpreter checks that every instruction before its execution satisfies
some specified properties in the form of constraints. These constraints can be
related to types or memory bounds. The safety of the byte code can be guaranteed
at linking time or loading time, so checking is done only once. Once the verification
has been performed then the normal JVM can execute the bytecode as many times
as needed.
More formally, the abstract interpreter is a transition relation that operates over
types of instructions and registers [25], and it is denoted in Figure 2.3 as
[[instr]] < S,R >⇒ < S ′, R′ >.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 15
Here instr is the instruction, S is the stack of types for instructions, and R is the
stack of types for each registers. S ′ and R′ are the new stacks, for instruction and
register types. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example rules for common instructions
used by the this transition relation model.
The rule iconst n simply pushes an int type on top of the stack denoted by int:S ;
in addition it checks that the current size of the stack is less than the maximum
stack size MaxStackSize. The second rule, iadd, takes two ints from the top of
the stack and pushes an int type on top of the stack denoted by int:S. When the
instruction iload is evaluated in the abstract machine, it checks that the register
at index n is of type int, also checks the bounds of the register n and the size of
the stack S. If all the checking is correct then it pushes a type int on top of the
stack. The instruction istore stores int type from the top of the stack int:S into
the type register R n. Before this substitution is performed it checks the limit of
n to be consistent to the size of R, n < MaxRegSize. The instructions aload and
astore have similar behaviour, but instead of checking that a type is an int type,
it looks for a more generic type of type Object, in the stack S and in the record
type set R. In all, there are more than 200 instructions for the JVM, here we have
presented the rules only for six of them to illustrate how the abstract machine for
types works.
If there is no transition for some state then the machine is stuck. For instance,
the istore rule assumes that the top of the stack must be an int. If we have
an opcode istore and the top of the stack type is not compatible with int then
there is no meaning for that state. It is important to say that the verification
consists of several steps, the abstract interpreter is applied only after previous
checking for sanity, and method initialisation. Here we only present some rules for
the verification of instructions inside a method; there are transition machines for
methods, and classes. For calculating types of objects it uses a subtyping relation
<:, where classes are subtypes of Object.
This model of verifying Java bytecode by combining DFA and type-checking is the
most common. However, the specification for JVM lacks the required formalism,
and some inconsistencies are found in the specification [22].
In order to provide a specification for JVM as the basis for a static method to
check the bytecode, a new formulation was proposed by Klein, Nipkow, Quian,
Coglio et al [22, 24, 60, 61], based on theorem provers such as HOL and Isabelle.
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Moreover, this formalism can be used by others to explore the properties of the
verification techniques or the JVM. The work was proven to be valid for a non-
trivial subset of byte code instructions, with mechanically checked proofs, offering
some guarantee of reliability.
2.3.2 Subroutines
The verification of Java bytecode is a hard task. One of the biggest problems
is verification of subroutines. They are problematic because subroutines share
the same stack frame as the method calling them; because of this sharing, the
addresses when a subroutine is called can have a polymorphic type. The main
reason of having subroutines in Java is to support the isolation of the code. The
classic example is the try − catch − finally block to handle exceptions when a
problem arises during the execution.
The subroutine verification problem for bytecode was first addressed in the work
of Stata and Abadi [21] at the end of the 90s. Klein developed a verified extended
checker for subroutines by using models in HOL/Isabelle in [62]. A complete sec-
tion in Leroy’s survey [25] reviews the history of subroutine verification problems,
and some solutions to handle this problem.
2.3.3 Lightweight Bytecode Verification
Another branch of bytecode verification is Lightweight Bytecode Verification (LBV ),
whose main purpose is to verify Java Smart Cards [63]. The proliferation of small
devices which execute untrusted byte code, brings new challenges into the scenario
of bytecode verification.
One of these problems is the small amount of resources available in such devices.
Under these conditions standard bytecode verification algorithms are not feasible,
due to the large amount of computation and memory usage. The first attempt to
verify code in small devices was proposed by Rose et al [64, 65]. The main idea of
LBV is to decouple the problem of the verification in two stages:
• At compilation time a certificate (the output of the data flow analysis (DFA))
is created,
Chapter 2. Literature Review 17
Figure 2.4: Lightweight bytecode verification diagram.
• At loading time the certificate (only the needed information) along with the
code is checked in the small device.
This approach reduces the computation steps required in the smart cards to val-
idate the bytecode. All the hard work has been done off-line, with results in the
form of a certificate.
The diagram in Figure 2.4 describes the overall mechanism of . In the compiler
side we have the DFA which produces a Certificate. This certificate makes use of
the typing rules for Java byte code. The Checker on the smart card side, takes
the certificate and validates it by reconstructing only the information that can
be obtained in one single pass in the bytecode. If the proof is correct then the
bytecode is sent to the JVM to be executed. Notice that the DFA and the Checker
make use of the type information reconstructed and assigned to each instruction
and stack frame by the LBV.
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2.4 PCC and TAL
2.4.1 Proof Carrying Code
Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [5] was proposed by Necula and Lee in 1997. The aim
of PCC is to provide a safety proof, along with the binary code, to the host system.
This proof is generated by the compiler or code producer, and attests that the
attached code respects the security policy provided by the code consumer. Formal
logic is used to express this safety policy. The PCC technique is based on the idea
of having almost all the process of verification performed by the producer. All the
code consumer has to do, is to check “off-line” the proof attached to the untrusted
code. Once this checking process is performed, and if the check succeeds, the code
consumer can execute the code without using extra verification tools. So execution
time is not increased.
In the PCC system, everything is centred around the safety policy [5]. The safety
policy (shown in Figure 2.5) is provided by the code consumer. Proof that a
safety policy is respected involves three components : a set of rules(e.g., type-
inference rules), the verification condition generator VCGen (producing Floyd-
Style predicates [34]), and the interface which is basically a set of preconditions
and post conditions describing the invariants before and after the function calls.
VCGen takes as input the safety rules, the assembly code, and the preconditions
and post conditions to compute a set of safety predicates in first-order logic. The
verification of this safety predicate is the proof that the code respects the safety
policy given by the code consumer. The verification is performed by a theorem
prover. The proof is encoded in a subset of Logical Framework (LF) along with
the assembly code, and sent forward to the code consumer. The code consumer
uses a type-checking algorithm for LF representation, to verify that the proof is
safe. If it type-checks, then the code respects the safety rules provided by the
consumer of the untrusted code.
Here we list some of the main advantages of the PCC technique :
• The verification of the proof is faster than its production. A fast type-
checking algorithm is used to prove the correctness of the proof attached to
the binary code.




Binary Code and Safety Proof
Proof Validation Safety Policy
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Figure 2.5: Proof-carrying code diagram.
• PCC is tamper-proof, any alteration in the binary code or in the proof is
trapped by the verification process. As analogy with types, we can see the
safety proof validation as type-checking. If we modify the code the program
then it might be not longer a valid typed program, in the same way, if we
modify the safety proof, then the validation results in an error. In the case
that the safety proof and the code are modified, if the proof respects the
safety policy then the program is safe, even if it is not correct.
• Common techniques can be used across different programming languages.
First-order logic provides a way to prove the correctness of a given program
independently of the language used to construct the program. The experi-
ments in the original PCC were focused on verifying type information and
memory safety.
• PCC verifies the correctness of code. It avoids reliance on trusted producers
(e.g., a certified compiler). It is a general framework that can be used even
if the source of code is untrusted.
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• This technique alleviates the problem of the verification on a target machine
with few resources, since the heavy part of verification is performed by the
producer.
The main disadvantages of PCC are:
• The size of the proof can be very big in comparison to the size of code.
• The VCGen is a big piece of code, the verification of such piece code is a
challenging task. A bug in the VCGen could end in a wrong verification
condition predicate.
2.4.2 Typed Assembly Language
A related technique to PCC is Typed Assembly Language (TAL) [6], which was
developed in 1998 by Morrissett et al. The basic idea in TAL system is that the
compiler can insert type information in the form of labels in the assembly code.
The approach of TAL systems is to preserve the typing information in the process
of compilation, from the source code to the assembly language. If the assembly
code type-checks then the code respects the operations or rules previously given
by the code consumer in the form of typing rules. This technique is less robust
than PCC, in the sense that it only tackles the problem of type safety.
Some compilers using this technique were developed, each of which preserves typing
information from source code to intermediate stages, such as closure conversion or
lambda lifting. Figure 2.6 depicts a staged transformation from System F (λF ) to
Typed Assembly Code (RISC instructions) as follows:
• The intermediate language λF is transformed to λK which uses Continu-
ation Passing Style. In this part of the transformation, the intermediate
language has continuations, instead of returning values the functions apply
a continuation to them.
• The transformation from λK to λC and λH is in two steps. The first one is a
simplified closure conversion; any variable from the context of the function
must be transformed to additional arguments of the specific function. The
second step is a lambda lifting process, in which all the local definitions of
functions are hoisted by using functions and parameters.












Figure 2.6: TAL transformation diagram.
• The transformation from λC and λH to λA is called allocation and produces
the intermediate language with “lets” as constructors, these let instructions
represent allocations in memory. Initialisation flags are added to every field
of tuples defined in the previous stage.
• The last transformation from λA to TAL generates the TAL code. A simple
type-checker algorithm checks the TAL code off-line.
Another implementation of TALx86 [26], is a realistic typed assembly language,
sufficient to implement a subset of typed C called Popcorn. Many properties can
be checked using typing information, those properties include memory address
allocation, types of the variables, stack-allocation, and basic type constructors
(e.g., arrays and tagged unions).
The TALx86 instructions are a significant set of INTEL IA32 (32-bit 80x86 flat
model) assembly language, to be executed on Intel Pentium processors. Table 2.1
identifies the main components involved in the TALx86 system.
TALx86 uses MASM syntax for data and instructions. The data is extended to
handle the type annotations inserted in the code. The type preconditions in form
of annotations, are used to specify the types of the instructions before the control
of the code is passed from one address to other. These kind of annotations are of
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TALx86 tools
talc Type-checker for TALx86 code.
link-verifier Linker for TALx86. Verifies that the linking of TALx86
files is safe.
assembler Assembles a TALx86 code to produce the object file
(COFF or ELF format)
popcorn Subset of C that compiles to TALx86.







mov eax,ecx ; i=n
inc eax ; ++i
mov ebx,0 ; s=0
jmp test
body :{eax:B4, ebx:B4}
add ebx,eax ; s+=i
test :{eax:B4, ebx:B4}
dec eax ; i--
cmp eax,0 ; i>0
jg body
Figure 2.7: An example of Popcorn and its TALx86 representation.
the form : ∀α1 : κ1...αm : κm.r1 : τ1, ..., r :n: τn where α1, ..., αm : are the bound
type variables, and allow registers to have a polymorphic type. The annotation
r1 : τ1, ..., r :n: τn says that every record from r1 through rn has the type τ1 to τn re-
spectively. The κ1 and κm allow the possibility of having different “kinds” of types
in the TALx86 implementation. The type-checker talc verifies that instructions
respect these type annotations for a given piece of assembly code.
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2.4.2.1 An example: The sum of the first n natural numbers.
Figure 2.7 shows Popcorn code to compute the sum of the first n numbers. The
fragment of the corresponding assembly code is in the same Figure 2.7. This
assembly code includes annotations for types in the body and test labels. In the
label body, the type annotations eax : B4 and ebx : B4 mean that eax and ebx
have type B4 (abbreviation of Byte 4). A similar situation occurs in the label test
where eax and ebx are required to be of type B4. This simple example shows how
the types are represented in TALx86.
Array-bounds checking is the one of most complicated aspects of TALx86. This is
because the size of the array is unknown until the execution of the code. TALx86
uses two type constructors: the first new type constructor is S(s), which is called
singleton type, where s is an integer expression. The purpose of this new type is
to assign an integer value to the register, for example, if ecx is represented as S(4)
then the value in ecx must be 4.
The second type constructor is array(s, τ) where τ is the type of the array elements
and s is an integer expression representing the size of the array.
One main difference between TAL and PCC is that TAL applies a type-checking
algorithm to the assembly code avoiding the use of proofs in a separate logical
framework (LF). There is no need for a separate theorem prover. In this way, the
size of the binary code is considerably reduced if it is compared against the binary
code produced by PCC systems. Provided that types are preserved along the whole
process of compilation, this technique generates safe assembly code automatically.
The main advantage of this technique is the reduction of the Trusted Code Base.
The verification process on the consumer side, requires only a type-checker for the
typed assembly code.
Advantages of TAL include :
• The size of the binary code is reduced. It is not necessary to have a proof in
a separate logical framework. The typed assembly language serves as source
for type-checking tools.
• A Simple and fast type-checking algorithm is applied to the annotated as-
sembly code. If the code type-checks then it is safe to execute. In practise
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the actual code is kept separated from the type information, allowing to
execute the assembly code in the standard way.
• The process to create typed assembly code can be automatic, by the preser-
vation of the types during the compilation process.
The main disadvantages of TAL are :
• Any program that violates a type system’s invariants will not be typeable
under that type system, even if the code is actually safe.
• It is less powerful and general than the PCC technique. PCC is more general
because it can be applied to check other properties not related to the type
system.
2.4.3 Foundational Proof Carrying Code
Foundational Proof Carrying Code (FPCC) was developed around 2001 by Appel
et al [27]. The main idea of FPCC is to reduce the Trusted Code Base (TCB)
proposed originally by Necula in his PCC system. The main motivation of FPCC
is to make the TCB as small as possible, without committing to any specific type
system [28]. In the FPCC system, the VCGen is eliminated in order to reduce the
TCB. Appel argues that the VCGen tool has too many lines of code (˜23,000 lines
of C). Proofs may be wrong due to the presence of a bug in VCGen, resulting in
a flawed verification process. In Figure 2.8, we can see that the only two elements
of the TCB are the Checker and the Axioms and Architecture Specification (the
safety policy). The models for types are independent of the safety policy, making
FPCC a more extensible system than its counterpart PCC.
The main advantages of the FPCC technique are:
• Reduction of the Trusted Code Base. The elimination of VCGen reduces
the size of the TCB, also the possible bugs inside the VCGen are eliminated.
Instead of using first-order predicate logic the FPCC system uses higher-
order logic predicates, which is a more powerful logic.













Figure 2.8: Foundational Proof-carrying code framework.
• FPCC uses the idea from TAL systems of producing assembly code with
types in an automatic way, and the approach of the PCC technique of hav-
ing a proof attached to the code that can be rigorously and mathemati-
cally checked. The proofs are generated and represented in Low-level TAL
(LTAL), which is a representation of machine-code.
• The separation of typing rules from safety policy makes the FPCC system
an extensible framework. With this advantage new models of types can be
added without any alteration in the current system.
The main drawback of FPCC is:
• A big amount of the logic is moved from VCGen to safety proofs. Due to
this situation the size of the proofs is greatly increased. The need for very
large proofs is the biggest cost of having a more general PCC system.
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2.4.4 Subsequent Developments Related to PCC and TAL
The three techniques we have reviewed were mainly developed in the years 1996-
1999 (PCC), 1997-2001 (TAL), and 2000-2004 (FPCC). Several research lines have
their foundations in those verification techniques. By using one of these techniques
the run-time is not modified. This property makes these methods good candidates
to verify programs in different environments without the need for a compiler or
interpreter on the consumer side. This idea provides a reliable verification frame-
work, even in small devices where the resources of hardware are limited. One of the
biggest challenges is the size of the proofs, the proof must be informative enough
and as small as possible in order to fit into the memory of the small devices where
the low-level code is executed. In addition the trusted computing base must be as
small as possible, due to the lack of power and data storage of the small devices.
Several research topics have been generated from these techniques [66–68]. Some
researchers target the reduction of proof size (see [29]), others the exploration of
new logic, and others the verification of other properties.
One application of PCC and FPCC is the project MOBIUS (Mobility Ubiquity
and Security) [69, 70]. The project involved universities and software companies
from around ten countries in Europe. The main goal of the MOBIUS project was
to generate secure Java byte code for mobile devices in a fully automated way, by
the combination of PCC techniques and JVM.
One particular characteristic of the MOBIUS project is that it uses types for in-
formation flow, so representing resources as well a classic types for code. The type
information is checked by using lightweight algorithms in the consumer side. The
problem of dealing with big certificates and reduction of the TCB are problems
that appeared during this project. In essence MOBIUS makes uses of the two
technologies related to PCC: type systems and program logic. This allows en-
forcement of other security properties such as user private data protection. The
creation of the certificates follows a logical approach.
The claims for the MOBIUS architecture are:
• The digital proofs can be independently checked by users or third parties.
• Static checking of code avoids run-time costs.
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• The techniques suit the real-world mix of mobile platforms.
• The solution supports developers who need to construct trusted applications.
2.5 Summary
The techniques for low-level static verification explored in the review of the liter-
ature are related. They verify low-level code and they use static analysis. Some
additional information is attached to the low-level code, guaranteeing the safe
execution of untrusted code without an overhead in execution time. In PCC a
proof of safety is attached along with the code. This proof of safety is produced
at compile time and is based in the safety rules provided by the code consumer.
The code consumer verifies the proof by using a simple theorem prover, and if
it holds then the foreign code is safe to execute. TAL system presents a similar
approach. However, instead of using a separate proof of safety, TAL produces
annotated code. This annotated assembly code is type-checked by a simple and
fast algorithm in the run-time system. TAL can be seen as an instance of PCC in
which only properties related to types are verified. Those techniques use a type-
checking algorithms for a given program in a low-level code. In the case of PCC,
it uses a theorem prover to verify the correctness of logical predicates. This mech-
anism presents a more general framework, because the properties are presented in
first-order logic, allowing with this the use of any tool to attest the correctness of
logical predicates. FPCC is an extension of PCC, the main goal is the reduction
of the Trusted Code Base and the creation of a scalable framework to guarantee
safety for low-level code. Additionally, FPCC introduces the LTAL concept, which
is a low-level code for TAL. FPCC uses LTAL which is a lower representation of
TAL, avoiding the problem of the verification of macro instructions (eg. malloc in
TALx86). We refer the reader to a complete review of TAL related techniques in
[9].
More recent work has focused on the reduction of the proofs or the reduction of the
TCB, for instance the approach of Abstraction Carrying Code [30–32], provides
another attempt to reduce the cost of the verification of the certificates, providing
a framework that is based in logical high-order language. In this work, the authors
propose to create small certificates based on fix point theory, and the checkers able
to check in one single pass. Even though this technique was developed to deal with
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high-level code it can be used for low-level code as in [32]. Some of the current work
on verification of low-level code is based on the combination of different techniques,
such as property based testing and type-checking [71]. The verification of Java
bytecode techniques provides an avenue of ideas and problems to be solved when
the bytecode is verified statically. In summary, the static verification techniques
are approximations of the run time behaviours. So static analysis still leaves room
for possible untrapped errors. In general, the gap between the approximations and
run time execution can be reduced by providing information in form of assertions,
type information, or data flow analysis outcomes.
Chapter 3
A Kit to Evaluate Tools that
Check Reduceron Code
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we give details of the machinery to perform our experiments check-
ing low-level code. Our experiments are based on Haskell models that abstract
the behaviour of the actual machine for the Reduceron. In §3.2 we give an intro-
duction to the Reduceron and we point out the connection to our work. In §3.3
we give a definition of the template code used by the Reduceron machine. In §3.4
we give a description of the Reduceron and its operational semantics. In §3.5 we
give a definition of our model for execution of Reduceron code and the classifica-
tion of the possible states where the machine fails. Then, in §3.6 we explain an
automated approach to produce mutation variants of template code, and compare
some alternatives to produce code. In addition we expose in a diagram the classifi-
cation of the outputs for our experiments. With this classification we can measure
the effectiveness of our static tools against the operational semantics. In §3.7 we
describe the kind of mutations used in our testing. We give a classification for the
test outcomes in §3.8. Finally in §3.9 we discuss the points of using the empirical
approach to measure the effectiveness of our static checking.
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3.2 Reduceron and Template Code
The Reduceron is an efficient graph-reduction machine based on template instan-
tiation. When a functional program is evaluated, construction and deconstruction
of expressions is performed in memory. On conventional computers, the use of
the memory is limited by serial access. An alternative to solve this problem, is
to evaluate functional programs on FPGAs where memory with parallel access
can be configured as needed. Reduceron takes advantage of this technology, and
in one clock-cycle can perform a complete reduction of a template application by
accessing parallel memories for the template, the stack and the heap [72].
The Reduceron machine executes a kind of bytecode known as template code,
which can be compiled from F-lite, a small functional lazy language described in
[72].
Some aspects are particular to Reduceron template code: it uses case tables index-
ing alternative templates to encode case expressions, and it uses a non-standard
applicative structure for primitives. For the purpose of our work the case tables
and the primitives deserve further explanation.
Case tables. Case-expression alternatives in F-lite are compiled to functions
by using the approach of Jansen/Scott encodings described in §2.4 of [72]. The
idea of the case table is to replace many functional arguments by a single tabular
argument to achieve more efficient evaluation.
Each case alternative in the case expression is represented in Reduceron code by a
functional template alti ~xi t ~v = ei where alti is applied to constructor arguments
~x, a case table argument t, and free variables ~v. The case table argument t is
never used in the right hand side expression ei.
Primitives. The Reduceron supports lazy evaluation, but the primitives need
evaluated arguments. The problem is solved by encoding primitive applications in
the form arg1 (arg0 prim). With this arrangement the arguments are evaluated
first. When the primitive is on the top of the stack the arguments are guaranteed
to be evaluated.
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Graph expressions and Templates. Each template can be viewed as a
low-level encoding of a let expression. The let-bindings are encoded as off-spine
applications and the body of the let as the spine-application. Each template
(arity, app, apps) in Reduceron template code is a tuple of arity, spine application
app and off-spine applications apps. Instead of names the results of the off-spine
applications are referred to by position (eg. PTR 0 for the first off-spine applica-
tion).
How Reduceron is Related to our Work? Is it possible to check the
low-level code statically before it is executed in the Reduceron processor?
In our work we will explore how to address the problem of static checking the
untyped template code where the primitives and case tables are particular to this
code. We shall perform the three static analysis in three stages: one for atoms,
another for applications, and finally one for templates and how they are related.
The checking of Reduceron template code is challenging mainly because in the
code there is no explicit type information: there are no declarations corresponding
to high-level recursive data types. In addition, it uses particular encodings of case
expressions and primitives which make it more complex to check than a standard
applicative approach. Constructors are indexed by arity and position, but at low-
level they are indistinguishable.
3.3 Template Code Syntax and Definition
The syntax of template code is defined in Figure 3.1. Template code for Reduceron
can be generated, for example, by compilation of Flite [73] source programs.
The Reduceron code is self described in Figure 3.1, most of the atoms are common,
the only exception is the constructor TAB i which is used to encode case tables,
see §2.4 in [1] for more details. Case tables are a special encoding in Reduceron
template code for case expressions. The case expressions are transformed using
Scott/Jansen encoding [74]. The case table constructor TAB i contains the in-
dex i to the case alternative. The case subject evaluation index and the index i









Atom ::= FUN a i Function with arity a and address i
| ARG i Reference to the ith function argument
| PTR i Pointer to the ith application
| CON a i Constructor of arity a and index i
| INT n Integer literal n
| PRI s Primitive function name s
| TAB i Case table
Figure 3.1: Template code syntax.
For instance, in Figure 3.2 the code for append, which uses a case expression with
two alternatives, is transformed to three function definitions, the first is for the
top-level definition append, and the second and the third are the consCase and the
nilCase alternatives. The TAB i atom is used to encode <consCase, nilCase>,
the index i will decide which alternative to choose depending on the evaluation of
the case subject xs.
In the case alternatives the argument t is never used in the right hand side of the
definitions.
--Flite Source
append xs ys = case (xs) of {




append xs ys = xs <consCase, nilCase> ys
consCase x xs t ys = Cons x (append xs ys)
nilCase t ys = ys
Figure 3.2: Jansen/Scott encoding for append function.
3.3.1 An Example of Reduceron Template Code
In Figure 3.3 we have the representation of the append source code and its trans-
lation to template code. As a convention, the first index of the templates in a
given program is zero.
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append xs ys = case (xs) of {
Cons x xs -> Cons x (append xs ys);
Nil -> ys; }
main = append Nil Nil;
(0,[FUN 2 1,CON 0 1, PTR 0],[[CON 0 1]])
(2,[ARG 0, TAB 2, ARG 1],[])
(2,[ARG 1],[])
(4,[CON 2 0, ARG 0, PTR 0],[[FUN 2 1, ARG 1, ARG 3]])
Figure 3.3: Flite append function translated from Flite to Template code.
The template number zero (0,[FUN 2 1, CON 0 1, PTR 0],[[CON 0 1]]), is the
main program, of arity zero. The atom FUN 2 1 indicates a function of arity
two and index one, FUN 2 1 is applied to two arguments CON 0 1 which is the
encoding for Nil. The atom PTR 0 is a reference to the off-spine application
number zero, which contains the second argument of the function append.
Now, the template number one is the function append of arity two (2,[ARG 0,
TAB 2, ARG 1],[]). In the spine application ARG 0 is the case subject xs, the
TAB 2 atom is a reference to the case alternatives, for example if the case subject
ARG 0 evaluates to Nil then the second template will be evaluated. Otherwise,
the third template will be evaluated. The atom ARG 1 is the free variable used
in all case alternatives.
The template number three is the recursive case alternative (4,[CON 2 0, ARG
0, PTR 0], [[FUN 2 1, ARG 1, ARG 3]]). The arity of this template is four, the
reason is the special encoding which includes the two arguments ARG 0 and ARG
1 representing x and xs, an argument for case table and one free variable. The
first atom CON 2 0 is a constructor which expects two arguments and the index of
this constructor is zero. The first argument is ARG 0 and the second is a pointer
the application [FUN 2 1, ARG 1, ARG 3]. This application corresponds to the
recursive application at the high-level (append xs ys).
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3.4 The Reduceron Machine
The reduction machine has four memory areas: the program, the heap, the stack
for reductions, and the stack for updates. These memories can be accessed in
parallel, in the same clock-cycle. The execution behaviour of a Reduceron can be
described by a small-step transition function from state S to state S ′, that is S
→ S ′. The state is a tuple (Prog × Stack ×Heap× UStack) described in Figure
3.4, in each step a transition rule is applied to one state S to give a new state
S ′. The computation is stopped if the Stack in the state S ′ is empty. The Heap
is modelled as a list of applications, and can be indexed by a heap-address. The














State ::= Prog Program
× Heap Heap
× Stack Reduction stack
× UStack Update stack
Figure 3.4: Reduceron machine description.
Before we start describing the transition rules, in Figure 3.5 we describe some
auxiliary functions used by the transition rules. The function arity gets the arity
of the atoms that can occur at the top of the stack. The atom arity of INT i
is 1, the atom PRI s expects 2 arguments, the atom FUN n i has arity n, and
finally the atom CON n i has arity n + 1, which is the number of arguments
plus a case table argument. The applyPrim rule applies a given primitive to its 2
arguments, in case of arithmetic primitive it returns an INT i with the result i,
or if the primitive is logic then it gives back a constructor CON 0 0 for false or
CON 0 1 for true value. The rule instApp instantiates the function body, it gives
back the replacement of the formal parameters with arguments from the reduction
stack and the relative pointer addresses are turned into absolute addresses. The
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arity (INT i) = 1
arity (PRI p) = 2
arity (FUN n i) = n
arity (CON n i) = n+ 1
applyPrim “(+)” n m = INT (n+m)
applyPrim “(−)” n m = INT (n−m)
applyPrim “(<=)” n m = bool (n <= m)
applyPrim “(==)” n m = bool (n == m)
applyPrim “(/ =)” n m = bool (n/ = m)
bool False = CON 0 0
bool True = CON 0 1
instApp s h = map (inst s (length h))
where
inst s base (PTR p) = PTR (base+ p)
inst s base (ARG i) = si
inst s base a = a
updateHeap i ap h = take i h ++ [ap] ++ drop (i+ 1)
Figure 3.5: Auxiliary functions used by Reduceron transition rules.
last auxiliary function updateHeap modifies the heap h with the application ap at
heap address i.
3.4.1 Transition rules for Reduceron
The transition rules [1] are defined in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. There is one transition
rule for each Atom in Figure 3.1.
• The transition rule PTR is used when the top of the stack is a pointer x to
an application. The evaluation proceeds by unwinding (The application is
copied from the heap to the stack). A pair is pushed onto the update stack:
the heap address x, and the size of the reduction stack increased by one 1 +
length s.
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• The rule for integer literals INT swaps the top of the stack and the subse-
quent atom. The integer arguments of a primitive application must be fully
evaluated before the application can be reduced. At run time because an in-
teger literal is already reduced, the subsequent atom needs to be reduced by
the rule n e → e n, where n is an integer literal and e is another expression.
• The rule for primitive functions PRI assume that the integer arguments are
fully evaluated before the application is reduced. At compile time the primi-
tive applications are transformed by the rule prim e0 e1 → e1 (e0 prim), by
doing this we can first evaluate its arguments (See sections 2.3 and Section
5 of [1] for further details).
• The rule for constructors CON looks for a corresponding case alternative
function in case table TAB i. There is no information immediately available
about the arity of the case alternative function (look at address i + j). How-
ever, we can use zero as arity FUN 0 (i+ j) : s, because a case alternative
function is never partially applied.
• The transition rule FUN applies a function f of arity n. We need to pop
n + 1 elements from the reduction stack. The spine application of the body
of f is instantiated and pushed onto the reduction stack. Finally, the re-
maining function applications are instantiated and added to the heap h′.
• The transition rule Update checks whether the arity of the atom on top of
the stack is greater than the updated stack address sa subtracted from the
length of the stack plus one. If that condition holds, then the heap h′ is
updated update ha (top : take n s) h in the new state.
To support the printing of the results from the computations, the Reduceron
machine makes use of two primitives: In Flite, both emit and emitInt are applied
to two arguments: the first is what is to be printed and the second is the result of
the emit or emitInt application. The primitive emit is used to print a character
and emitInt for integer numeric values. We have an extra component to our
machine, which is used to store the result of the computation, we call it r. It is
only used when we print or accumulate printings, for example a list of numbers
from 1 to 10 will be accumulated as 12345678910. Similarly for a list of characters.
We make use of two auxiliary functions which are print and printC. The function
print shows the integer value, and printC the character contained in the value n
as an ASCII code.
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PTR rule:
< p, h, PTR x : s, u >
=⇒ < p, h, hx : s, upd : u >
where
upd = (1 + length s,x)
INT rule:
< p, h, INT n : x : s, u >
=⇒ < p, h, x : INT n : s, u >
PRI rule:
< p, h, PRI f : x : y : s, u >
=⇒ < p, h, applyPrim f x y : s, u >
CON rule:
< p, h, CON n j : s, u >
=⇒ < p, h, FUN 0 (i+ j) : s, u >
where
TAB i = sn
FUN rule:
< p, h, FUN n f : s, u >
=⇒ < p, h′, s′, u >
where
(pop, spine, apps) = pf
h′ = h ++ map (instApp s h) apps
s′ = instApp s h spine ++ drop pop s
Update rule:
< p, h, top : s, (sa, ha) : u >
=⇒ state
where
n = 1 + length s − sa
h′ = updateHeap ha (top : take n s) h
state = < p , h′, top : s, u > if arity top > n
Figure 3.6: Reduction rules for Reduceron.
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PRI emitInt rule:
< p, h, PRI ”emitInt” : e : s, u, r >
=⇒ < p, h, e : PRI ”emitInt” : s, u, r >
PRI emit rule:
< p, h, PRI ”emit” : e : s, u, r >
=⇒ < p, h, e : PRI ”emit” : s, u, r >
INT emitInt rule:
< p, h, INT n : PRI ”emitInt” : s, u, r >
=⇒ < p, h, s, u, r ++ print n >
INT emit rule:
< p, h, INT n : PRI ”emit” : s, u, r >
=⇒ < p, h, s, u, r ++ printC n >
Figure 3.7: Reduction rules for Reduceron(Emit and EmitInt Rules).
• The rules PRI emitInt and PRI emit swap the top of the stack and the sub-
sequent atom denoted by e, by doing this, the expression e will be evaluated
first.
• The INT emitInt takes out the top two atoms from the stack, and accu-
mulates n from INT n as a printed result in r.
• The INT emit takes out the top two atoms from the stack, and accumulates
the character value n from INT n as a printed result in r.
3.4.2 An Example: Minimum of Two Values
The state is a tuple (Program×Heap×Stack×UStack). The program minim in
Figure 3.8 is executed by following the transition states in Figure 3.9, it illustrates
how the Reduceron rules are applied. The program minim calculates the minimum
value of two given values. The initial state is (p, [ ], [FUN 0 0], [ ]), here p is the
program minim. The final state is when the stack is [INT i]. In this example the
last state is (p, [[PRI (<=), INT 10], [ ]], [INT 1], [ ]).
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main = minim 1 10




The case expressions are translated to case table
main = minim 1 10
minim a b = (b (a (<=))) <minimFalse,minimTrue>
minimFalse a b t = b
minimTrue a b t = a
Translation to the actual template code requires positional reference to templates,
arguments and a single off-spine application. Recall that the first component in
each template is its arity.
(0,[FUN 2 1,INT 1,INT 10],[])
(2,[ARG 1,PTR 0,TAB 2],[[(ARG 0,PRI (<=)]])
(3,[ARG 1],[])
(3,[ARG 0],[])
Figure 3.8: An illustrative example of minim program.
initial state
< p, [ ], [FUN 0 0], [ ] >
⇒ (FUN)
< p, [ ], [FUN 2 1, INT 10, INT 1], [ ] >
⇒ (FUN)
< p, [[INT 10, PRI(<=)]], [INT 1, PTR 0, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [ ] >
⇒ (INT)
< p, [[INT 10, PRI(<=)]], [PTR 0, INT 1, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [ ] >
⇒ (PTR)
< p, [[INT 10, PRI(<=)]], [INT 10, PRI(<=), INT 1, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [(5, 0)] >
⇒ (INT)
< p, [[INT 10, PRI(<=)]], [PRI(<=), INT 10, INT 1, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [(5, 0)] >
⇒ (Update)
< p, [[PRI(<=), INT 10]], [PRI(<=), INT 10, INT 1, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [ ] >
⇒ (PRI)
< p, [[PRI(<=), INT 10]], [CON 0 0, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [ ] >
⇒ (CON)
< p, [[PRI(<=), INT 10]], [FUN 0 2, TAB 2, INT 1, INT 10], [ ] >
⇒ (FUN)
< p, [[PRI(<=), INT 10], [ ]], [INT 1], [ ] >





SF ::= State⊕ Failure
Figure 3.10: RunCheck transition function.
3.5 RunCheck : The Dynamic Checking Model
The model RunCheck is a totalized model of the operational semantics of Reduc-
eron described in §3.4. With this model we intend to detect and classify the errors
arising during the execution.
In Figure 3.10 RunCheck is a transition function from state to a new state or
a trapped error, S → SF . Where the Id is the number of the failure, and the
Description is a string telling a brief information about the failure.
The sum type of the result SF captures the idea of a dual behaviour. When
the machine fails the transition yields a tuple of id and error description Id ×
Description. If the machine can perform the computation from one state to
another, then it returns a valid state.
The totalized transition rules are defined in Figure 3.11. Only the rules for PTR,
PRI, FUN , CON , and Update are changed in this evaluation model. In addition,
we changed the Arity auxiliary function when the element on the top of the stack
is not defined.
• In the transition rule PTR the pointer x must be a reference to a valid
application in the heap. We capture this idea in the constraint 0 <= x <
length h, if this condition fails then we return an invalid heap address error.
• In the rule for primitive functions PRI, we add the condition to check if a
primitive is in the set of valid primitives ps= {(+),(<=),(−),(==),(/ =)}.
• In order to totalize the rule CON, we need to add the condition n < length s
and s ! n = TAB i, which means that the arguments are valid in the scope
of the stack, and that the index of the constructor i points to a TAB i
constructor, otherwise the rule returns a bad stack pattern error.
Chapter 3. 41
• The transition rule FUN applies a function f of arity n. We need to pop
n + 1 elements from the reduction stack. The spine application of the body
of f is instantiated and pushed onto the reduction stack. Finally, the re-
maining function applications are instantiated and added to the heap h’.
• The transition rule Update the condition that must hold, is the arity checking
arity top > n. In the auxiliary rule Arity, we have decided to assign a
negative arity in case that the atom in the top of the stack is not a valid
atom.
3.6 Mutating Reduceron Code
In our experiments to evaluate code-checkers, we need a suitable framework to
emulate the situation when the code is altered or modified, perhaps maliciously
to cause some damage during the evaluation in the target machine. Possible
approaches include : randomly created programs, hand-coded programs, and mu-
tated programs. Each has advantages and drawbacks.
Randomly created programs Let us firstly consider the idea of producing
arbitrary random programs [75–78]. It seems to fit in our framework for testing.
The framework QuickCheck [77] could be used to produce programs randomly.
However the random approach is not a good candidate for our testing purposes
because the programs created are completely arbitrary. For instance, we could
have a empty list [ ] representing a list of templates. The design for obtaining
programs close to genuine programs or programs that are not too expensive in
terms of computation steps is complex in the random scenario.
Alteration by hand Another possibility is to create programs completely by
hand, or by hand modification. This provides a good technique and close to what
we want: bad code produced by hand or altered by hand. According to some
experiments of hand-writing code we realise that it is easy to make a mistake, for
example confusion in the order of function arguments. The drawback of this tech-
nique is that it takes too much time to produce programs compared to randomly
created programs for example.
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PTR rule
< p, h, PTR x : s, u >
=⇒ state
where
upd = (1 + length s, x)
state = < p, h, hx : s, upd : u > , if 0 <= x < length h
state = (2,’Invalid HEAP address’) , otherwise
PRI rule




state = < p, h, primApply f x y : s, u> , if f ∈ ps
state = (7,’Invalid primitive’) , otherwise
CON rule
< p, h, CON n j : s, u >
=⇒ state
where
state = < p, h, FUN 0 (i + j) : s, u > , if n < length s ∧ sn = TAB i
state = (5,’Bad STACK pattern’) , otherwise
FUN rule
< p, h, FUN n f : s, u >
=⇒ state
where
(pop, spine, apps) = pf
h′ = h ++ map (instApp s h) apps
s′ = instApp s h spine ++ drop pop s
state = < p, h′, s′, u > , if f < length p
state = (5,’Bad Template address’) , otherwise
Update rule
< p, h, top : s, (sa, ha) : u >
=⇒ state
where
n = 1 + length s − sa
h′ = update ha (top : take n s) h
state = < p, h′, top : s, u > , if arity top > n
state = (5,’Bad STACK pattern’) ,otherwise
Figure 3.11: Reduction rules for RunCheck.
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Mutated programs The mutation technique was proposed by DeMillo [79]
late in the 70’s, and followed by [80–87]. By mutating we intend to emulate the
scenario in which we have code close to genuine code. This mutated code is the
original code slightly modified. The idea of mutation is to start from an original
valid program (that terminates under the operational semantics).
Once we have this genuine program, it is mutated by altering selected atoms, or
changing the position of two contiguous atoms, or deleting an arbitrary atom. By
performing small mutations, we create a mutant based on a genuine program and
not arbitrary programs as in the random approach.
The number of mutations that we can create is in proportion to the number of
atoms in the original program. Mutation takes the best of the other two tech-
niques: realistic programs produced automatically. If the number of atoms in a
given program is too small to produce enough mutations, we can create compound
mutations based on a series of mutations (depth zero,depth 1,...,depth n). In the
literature of mutation testing the mutations of depth one are called FOM (first
order mutations) and the ones of any depth greater than one are called HOM
(higher order mutation) [33].
Mutated programs and Random Selection For the purpose of our exper-
iments, we generate first a list of all the possible mutations, and secondly, from
that list we randomly extract an arbitrary number of mutations.
Our Mutation Testing Approach. For our work we reuse the idea of dam-
aging code from mutation testing. But the use we make of mutant programs is
different. In classic mutation testing, mutations are used to measure the effective-
ness of a test suite in terms of the ability to detect faults [33]. If a test suite can
detect a problem in a mutant, then that mutant is “killed” (a good thing!). A key
step in mutation testing is to compare the output of the original valid program
against the output of each mutant.
In our case we do not compare results computed by each mutation with those
computed by the original program. Instead for each mutant we compare its be-
haviour under the operational semantics, against the outcome of static checking.
Our aim is to measure the effectiveness of the static checker. We do not care about
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the correctness of a mutant; if the machine computes any value, without crashing,
that is fine for our purposes.
The well known problem of equivalent mutants [33] can arise when mutation testing
is used to evaluate test suites. A mutant may happen always to compute the same
result as the original program, so no test suite can kill it. This problem is no
concern here. We only want to know if each mutant is well-behaved or not, and if
it is well-checked or not. The result it computes is ignored.
Random Testing and Further Discussion Another way of constructing
realistic test programs is the use of random generators based on with attribute-
grammars, as in the work of Drienyovszky, Horpasci et al. [88], where QuickCheck
is applied to test refactoring tools for Erlang. The attribute-grammar generator
provides a more expressive mechanism [89] than a context-free-grammar generator.
The code for the generators is more concise and maintainable than one developed
using the standard generator method of QuickCheck.
The idea of using program generators to automate the testing of programming-
language tools can be quite successful. For instance, in the work of Daniel, Dig et
al. [90] they found 45 previously unreported bugs in Eclipse and NetBeans, which
are the most used refactoring tools for Java. Here the idea of the generators is
taken from QuickCheck generators, even if they do not use random testing. This
approach uses Java classes and an imperative and exhaustive way of generating
test programs.
We could have used similar program-generation techniques to test our tools. How-
ever, we decided to use the idea of mutants because it is a simple approach to
implement, and it produces tests that are quite close to a well-behaved program.
3.7 Kinds of Mutations
3.7.1 Introduction
Recall that a template body includes spine-application and off-spine applications.
Every application is a sequence of atoms. The idea of mutation in our framework
is to damage a single atom. Even such minimal damage can be enough to change
Chapter 3. 45
completely the behaviour of a genuine piece of code. The algorithm to mutate the
template traverses the structure of the template, then by applying a simple rule
over atoms we obtain a new program which we call a mutant. We mutate a single
atom and obtain one mutation.
Increment Mutations To explain this idea consider an atom FUN i j which
denotes a function with arity i and index j. The main idea is to attack slightly
the code by atomic mutation. We can alter i or j by incrementing. For instance
if j = 1 we then can increment by one and obtain a mutated atom. For example
the original FUN 1 1 atom will become FUN 1 2, with this slight change we have
obtained a completely new function.
Now suppose that, in another template code, we have a function argument denoted
by ARG 2. If we mutate it to ARG 1 or ARG 3, the meaning of applying one
given function to the mutated argument is completely different. We see, in this
way we can alter every single numeric value inside each constructor, we call this
type of mutation increment mutation.
Deletion of Atoms Another way of mutating the code is the deletion of one
arbitrary atom in the template, for instance in the application [FUN 2 2, ARG
0, ARG 1], we can delete ARG 0 or ARG 1, letting the function application have
only one argument instead of two. Or we can delete the atom FUN 2 2 as a more
radical mutation.
Swapping of Atoms The third type of mutation is to swap two adjacent atoms.
From our example [FUN 2 2,ARG 0,ARG 1] we can get [ARG 0,FUN 2 2,ARG 1]
or [FUN 2 2,ARG 1,ARG 0]. This last small mutation evokes the common error
when a programmer changes the order of the arguments in one function.
Even the single atomic mutations can damage or alter the code significantly. For
the human reader it is almost impossible to distinguish between original valid code
and mutated variants. Imagine pages of template code: such small changes are
imperceptible. The mutated code can be very close to the original but it can
be wrong. The three types of mutations can be combined causing possibly more
damage.
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length= [(0,[FUN 1 1,PTR 0],[[CON 0 1]]),
(1,[ARG 0,TAB 2 2 0],[]),
(3,[FUN 1 1,ARG 1,PTR 0],
[[INT 1,PRI "(+)"]]),
(1,[INT 0],[])]
Figure 3.12: Template code for length function
3.7.2 Mutation Rules
Increment Mutations In general, the number of mutations from a given pro-
gram p is directly proportional to the number of atoms and the number of numer-
ical values in the atomic constructors. For example in Figure 3.12, if we want to
use the increment mutation, the atoms excluding the first template (it is the main
function) are [ARG 0, TAB 2 2 0 , FUN 1 1, ARG 1, PTR 0, INT 1, PRI ”(+)”,
INT 0].
From the rule for mutating atoms in Figure 3.14, we see that the mutations depend
on the rule [mInt] which mutates the numeric values from n+1 to n+3, in Table
3.1 we have evidence of the rounded average in some numeric values. In general
the average of those numeric values is 2. Based on that observation we decided
to mutate from n + 1 to n + 3. Using more than n + 3 will create non-useful
mutations. For instance in the Template Arity column in Table 3.1 we can see
that the possible number of arguments is on average 2. Then mutating the ARG
0 we obtain ARG 1, ARG 2, ARG 3, using the convention n+ 1 to n+ 3.
And the [mPri] rule which selects a different primitive from the five possible
primitives.
If we apply the mA rule to each atom in the length function, we obtain 28 mu-
tations, and they are distributed for each atom in Figure 3.13. Note the rule for
mutate the atom TAB i j k, for our experiments we have mutated only the numeric
value i, which represents the address position of the first case alternative. We leave
the other two constructors unchanged, is because in the operational semantics the
arguments j and k are not considered during the reductions.
For our experiments we generate all the possible mutations, then we select n
mutations randomly. The advantage of this approach is that we can test the
mutations randomly or take all the possible mutations generated. Moreover, we
can mutate mutations, which is useful when we have small programs to test. For
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ARG 0 3 mutations , TAB 2 2 0 3 mutations
FUN 1 1 6 " , ARG 1 3 "
PTR 0 3 " , INT 1 3 "
PRI "(+)" 4 " , INT 0 3 "
Figure 3.13: Number of mutations for each atom in length function
instance, the mutation of function length only produces 28 mutations. So possibly
under this case it is better to mutate the 28 mutations.
Swapping Mutations This rule swaps two contiguous elements in a list, and
creates all swapped lists excluding the original list.
swaps xs= nub([i ++ swap t|(i,t) <- zip (inits xs) (tails xs)])\\[xs]
swap [] = []
swap (y:x:xs) = (x:y:xs)
swap x = x
Delete Mutations This rule deletes one element in a list at a time, and creates
all the deleted lists. It deletes only if there is more than one atom in the list
of atoms denoted by xs to avoid the “obvious” generation of a bad template
(arity,[ ],[ ]).
deletesp xs= [delete (xs!!i) xs| i<-[0..length xs-1], length xs > 1]
All Mutations The kind of mutation that combines the previous mutations is
called All, and it is given by Increment + Swapping + Delete.
The mutator could be extended easily to support other types of mutations, for
example swapping or deleting applications.
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mA [[FUN n i]]⇒ {FUN n′ i |n′ ∈ mInt n}
∪ {FUN n i′ | i′ ∈ mInt i}
mA [[ARGm]]⇒ {ARGm′ |m′ ∈ mInt m}
mA [[PTR i]]⇒ {PTR i′ | i′ ∈ mInt i}
mA [[CON nm]]⇒ {FUN n′m |n′ ∈ mInt n}
∪ {CON nm′ |m′ ∈ mInt m}
mA [[INT i]]⇒ {INT i′ | i′ ∈ mInt i}
mA [[PRI s]]⇒ {PRI s′ | s′ ∈ mPri s}
mA [[TAB i j k]]⇒ {TAB i′ j k | i′ ∈ mInt i}
mInt [[n]]⇒ {n+1..n+3}
mPri [[s]]⇒ {+,−,==, <=, / =} − {s}
Figure 3.14: Rule to mutate atoms by incremental damage.
Table 3.1: Averages of templates arities, case alternatives arities, and function
arities in the set of benchmark programs.
Program Template Arity Tab Alts Fun Arity
queens 2 2 2
queens2 2 2 2
ordlist 2 2 2
braun 2 2 2
while 3 2 2
adjoxo 2 2 2
sudoku2 2 2 2
mss 2 2 2
permsort 2 2 2
parts 2 2 2
taut 2 2 2
clausify 2 2 2
cichelli2 2 2 2
mate 3 2 2
knuthbendix 3 2 2
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3.8 Classification of Results
We have created a classification to measure the effectiveness of our static checking
techniques for Reduceron code. The Venn diagram in Figure 3.15 depicts this
classification.
The Mu set represents a list of mutations chosen randomly. Here it is important
to notice that we only use the needed templates to generate mutations. We run
a simple analysis to detect which templates are used during the execution. That
information is passed to the mutator at mutation time. This checking is funda-
mental for our experiments, some of the benchmark programs take too long to
evaluate, and we use the minimal initial configuration to have the most possible
templates executed in the least execution time. Consider the case where we have
200 mutations and each mutation takes one minute to be evaluated, then it will
take more than three hours to compare the run-time outcome against the static
technique.
Also, we eliminate the set of dead code Dc, which is not present in the diagram.
We execute the original program and determine which templates are used. After
this analysis, we only mutate those templates used during the execution.
The set Wf is the set of well-formed mutations. By first applying a simple well-
formedness test to mutants we eliminate the obvious failures, e.g. a pointer out
of the scope or a primitive wrongly called “(++)”. In Chapter 4 we will describe
the well-formed analysis which is called AtomCheck.
The Nt set represents the set of programs with non-termination issues. Even if the
original test program might terminate, mutated variants may not. We make use
of a conservative test, to approximate the conditions under which a program does
not terminate. If the number of steps to execute the mutated program exceeds
double the number of steps needed to execute the original program, the mutant is
assumed to be non-terminating.
The set Ok is the set of programs that are well-behaved in the Reduceron machine.
We assume that they have passed the non-termination test described before.
The set Sc is the set of programs well-checked in some static method. In the
development of this thesis, we have several stages of static checking.
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Figure 3.15: Mutation classification diagram.
The set Gp represents the programs which are ill-checked yet well-behaved: these
programs are rejected by the static checker, but if executed they would not in fact
cause a machine failure by the run-time system.
Finally, the Bp set is the set of programs which are allowed by the static checker
and stopped by the run-time system.
3.9 Summary
The Reduceron uses the template instantiation machine model, but has parallel
circuits to create the instance, update the stack, and reduce the graph in one
single clock cycle. We have “totalized” the operational semantics for Reduceron
to be able to detect and classify possible faults. The tool kit for testing and
experimenting is based on a mutation technique where the mutations are chosen
randomly. In this way we have test programs that are very close to the original and
well-behaved code. Moreover, by repeating mutation if necessary, a large number
of programs to test can be generated automatically.
Using mutated code variants as a test, we can evaluate the static methods against
the operational semantics in order to measure the effectiveness of the static tech-




In this chapter we present an equation-based type-checking system for Reduceron
template code. Even when no extra annotations are added to the template code we
can compute type information from the raw template code. The purpose of this
type-checking system TyreCheck – Type-based Reduceron Code Checker –, is to
guarantee a form of type safety at loading time before executing the template code.
As outlined in Chapter 3 we use mutated programs to measure the effectiveness
of TyreCheck experimentally.
Static checking of the template code is divided into three stages as follows :
• AtomCheck. In §4.2 we describe this stage. This stage checks that each
atom of the template code satisfies requirements for well-formedness.
• PrimCheck. Static analysis that eliminates primitive applications, avoiding
the need for dependent types. This part is described in §4.3.
• TyreCheck. Type reconstruction based on equations instead of the tradi-
tional type inference rules. The details of this static method are described
in §4.4. This is the most complex part of the three.
In §4.5 we present some results from an evaluation of TyreCheck effectiveness.
Finally, in §4.6 we give a brief discussion of our techniques.
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type Program = [Template]
type Template = (Arity,App,[App])
type Arity = Int
type App = [Atom]
data Atom = INT Int
| FUN Arity Int
| ARG Int
| PRI String
| CON Arity Int
| PTR Int
| TAB Int Int Int
Figure 4.1: Haskell data type representation of Template code.
From TAB i to TAB i j k During development of an initial static checker a
need became apparent to know how many alternatives belong to each case table,
and also to determine how many variables are in use. As a cheap method to provide
this information we decided to add two parameters to TAB atoms. Atom TAB i
becomes TAB i j k, where j is the number of case alternatives associated with that
TAB, and k is the number of free variables in all the case alternatives. We made
this change at compile time, so no extra time is required during the static analysis.
At compile time we know the information about the number of case alternatives
and the number of free variables. This small change is not comparable to the
change of adding type signatures or logic-based formulae as code annotations.
4.2 AtomCheck
The template code can be represented by a Haskell data type as in Figure 4.1. A
program is a list of templates. Each template represents a function definition con-
sisting of arity, spine application, and off-spine applications. An application is a
list of atoms, which is either a numerical literal represented by INT Int, or a func-
tion with the arity and the index of the function in the list of templates represented
as FUN Arity Int, or a function argument ARG Int, or a numeric or boolean prim-
itive PRI String, or a pointer to an application PTR Int, or a special case table
atom used to encode case expressions and represented as TAB Int Int Int, where
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the first parameter is the index of the first template to be considered as a case
alternative, the second argument is the number of alternatives used by that case
table, and the third argument is the number of free variables in the case table. In
the rest of this Chapter, we will refer to this Haskell data type as the template
code which we are checking.
The first method in the process checks that template code is free of ill-formed
atoms. For example we reject a primitive atom PRI “(++)” which is not part of
the valid primitive set, or a function FUN i j, where j is an index greater than the
number of the actual templates in the code.
In Figure 4.2 we present a model for checking well-formedness at the atomic level.
The rule cProg is applied to each template T in the program P. The rule cTemp
examines every single application inside of a template. For each atom in each
application it applies the cAtom rule.
For each template T ∈ P:
• For each atom FUN n a the address a must be greater than or equal to zero,
and less than or equal to the number of templates in the program.
• For each atom ARG i the index i of the argument must not exceed the size
of the arity of the enclosing template.
• For each atom PTR i the off-spine application index i must be greater than
or equal to zero, and less than the number of off-spine applications in the
enclosing template.
• For each atom CON n i the arity n and the index i must both be greater
than or equal to zero.
• For each atom PRI s, the primitive name s must belong to the set of valid
primitives.
• Finally, for each atom TAB i j k each of the indexes i, j must both be greater
than zero, and k must be non-negative. In addition the sum of i and j, must
be less than or equal to the number of templates in the program.
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cProg [[ P ]]⇒ ∀T ∈ P : cTemp [[ T ]]
cTemp [[ arity, spineApp, offspineApps ]]⇒ ∀ a ∈ spineApp ∪ offspineApps :
cAtom [[ a ]]
cAtom [[ FUN n addr ]] ⇒ addr ≥ 0 ∧ addr ≤ lp
cAtom [[ ARG m ]] ⇒ arity > m
cAtom [[ PTR addr ]] ⇒ addr ≥ 0 ∧ addr < la
cAtom [[ CON n m ]] ⇒ n ≥ 0 ∧m ≥ 0
cAtom [[ INT i ]] ⇒ True
cAtom [[ PRI s ]] ⇒ s ∈ {(+),(-),(==),(/=),(<=),emit,emitInt}
cAtom [[ TAB i j k ]] ⇒ i > 0 ∧ j > 0 ∧ k ≥ 0 ∧ i+ j ≤ lp
where
arity = arity of the enclosing template
lp = # of the enclosing program
la = # of enclosing application
Figure 4.2: AtomCheck conditions of well-formed atom.
4.2.1 Measuring Effectiveness of AtomCheck
In Table 4.1 we see the results of evaluating AtomCheck alone against the oper-
ational semantics. The experiments of table are based on 200 mutations chosen
randomly. For example, from the 200 mutations in queens we have 48 well-
behaved programs, 171 accepted by AtomCheck, zero good programs rejected by
AtomCheck, and 111 bad programs accepted by AtomCheck. For the rest of the
programs similar proportions of the results are observed. One notable part of
this table is column GP, which represents the well-behaved programs stopped by
AtomCheck. AtomCheck is not rejecting valid programs.
4.3 PrimCheck
In the next stage we analyse and transform template code to reduce and isolate the
problems derived from uses of primitive operations. The high-level representation
of prim a b, where a primitive function prim is applied to the arguments a and b, is
compiled to template code applications equivalent to b (a prim). This order allows
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Table 4.1: Mutations (200-All-AtomCheck)
Program OK AtomCheck GP BP NT
queens 48 171 0 111 12
permsort 41 164 0 120 3
queens2 51 167 0 113 3
ordlist 55 168 0 110 3
parts 53 170 0 112 5
braun 31 162 0 125 6
mss 26 170 0 135 9
adjoxo 64 175 0 108 3
sudoku 33 167 0 130 4
tautology 45 172 0 118 9
cichelli2 37 173 0 131 5
the argument be reduced to an atom of integer type. The primitive functions must
be fully saturated to satisfy the Reduceron semantics.
We have explored some alternatives, for example representing the types for prim-
itives as dependent types indexed by arity. In addition to the implication of using
dependent types in a full type system, problems arise because of the nature of
partial applications during the type-checking process. Primitive applications must
be fully saturated.
Why not Dependent Types in the Type-checking System? The com-
pilation rule for primitives is prim a b → b(a prim). From the point of view of
types this arrangement where the arguments are applied to the primitives repre-
sents a challenge. In a standard type system, if we have an arithmetic primitive
with two arguments, its type is int→ int→ int. If we are to keep an applicative
view of Reduceron code, what types can be assigned to the primitive arguments
(a and b above) used as functions? One possible solution to address the prob-
lem is to use dependent types: we might introduce type equivalences for integers
int = prim (n+ 1) r → prim n r and int = prim 0 r.
For example, suppose we have the template
(2, [ARG 1,PTR 0], [[ARG 0,PRI(+)]]). In the application [ARG 0,PRI(+)] the
type of ARG 0 is prim 2 r → prim 1 r, a functional type denoting the reduction
in the arity from two to one, but preserving the result type denoted by r. We need
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to distinguish between arithmetic and logic primitives, as r could be either int or
bool. Binary primitives have type prim 2 r, the type of PRI(+) is prim 2 int.
Now for the application of the argument ARG 1 to [ARG 0,PRI (+)] we apply the
same mechanism. The type for the whole template body
[ARG 1,PTR 0],[[ARG 0,PRI(+)]] is prim 0 r. We identify the type prim 0 r with
r.
Trying to encode all these possibilities adds more complexity to a type-checking
system. Because primitives are fully saturated we even need still more testing
conditions. Certainly, we could use this idea of dependent types, but it could be
complicated. We have experimented with this approach but it caused too many
problems. We decided to do the analysis related to primitive application in a
previous stage before type-checking.
By using a primitive reduction analysis before type checking we have two gains:
(1) we can detect when a primitive is not fully saturated and stop bad programs
before the process of type inference, and (2) we eliminate all the primitive appli-
cations working instead with a simple integer type.
4.3.1 Divide and Conquer
Separating primitive analysis from a later stage of type-checking has some other
advantages, besides the division of the work :
• We can stop some bad programs at an early stage without the full cost of
type-checking.
• We avoid the need to use dependent types.
We call this stage of our static analysis PrimCheck for Primitive Checking. The
main idea of PrimCheck is to eliminate once and for all primitive applications
from the code. At the end of PrimCheck analysis, from each template in the code
we have derived a split template, with no occurrences of primitives but with the
possible addition of integer blocks. PrimCheck analysis is applied after the well-
formedness test of AtomCheck. In Figure 4.3 we explain the overall process of
PrimCheck.
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At the implementation level, PrimCheck takes as an argument one template, and
returns a pair containing a template and a list of integer blocks. In the integer
blocks we obtain all the collected arguments or applications that must be integers.
All primitives in Reduceron must be applied to two arguments. The first step is
to change all the occurrences of the atoms PRI s to PRIM 2 t. That is why each
PRI atom can be reduced to a PRIM 2 t atom : the 2 indicates arity and the t
indicates the result type of the primitive. During the process of PrimCheck arities
in PRIM atom are reduced until they reach zero. The PRIM 0 t is reduced to t.
Once the replacement of the primitives is performed, we apply the reduction rule
for primitives. It takes a pair of template and integer blocks and returns a split
template. The PrimApply rule is applied until it reaches a fix point. The rule
works as follows :
• if there are no primitives in the template, then it just finishes returning the
same template.
• if there is a primitive in the head of any application it means that the prim-
itive reduction cannot be completed, and it is a failure.
• otherwise the application in the template is split and inlined.
In order to obtain the new split application we need to check several things. There
are two cases:
• If there are primitive and pointer atoms in the same application ap, and
that pointer makes reference to any other application in the list of all the
applications, and that application contains a primitive, then we return the
pair (ap,[ ]), the same application and the empty list of integer blocks.
• Otherwise, we proceed to split the application ap by using the rule splitPrimApp.
The heart of the algorithm is the rule splitPrimApp. This rule takes an ap-
plication and returns an application and a list of integer blocks. The objective
is to split the application where we found a primitive. By doing this, we ob-
tain two lists, the first list is pulled out into an integer block. The other
list is evaluated to reduce the primitive arity by one. A similar process is
applied in both spine and off-spine applications.
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Once we have collected all the splittings for the entire template, inlining is applied.
The rule inline checks for every atom in the split template. If a PTR atom
referring to a singleton application contains a singleton containing a PRIM atom,
then, the primitive atom is inlined. Then the rule soloPrims replaces all the
singleton primitive applications in the split template with empty applications.
In this way, PrimCheck preserves the order of the applications in the list of the
off-spine applications.
Apart from the logical and numeric primitives, there are two special primitives to
print the results from the computation in the Reduceron machine. The rules to
deal with atoms PRI emitInt and PRI emit are applied before the rules for the con-
ventional primitives and they are described in rules emitApply and splitEmitApp.
The main difference is in rule splitEmitApp, which splits the application where a
primEmit is found. It checks which are the arguments of emit, and makes those
arguments integer blocks. The application of the emit primitive is reduced to
INT 0.
4.3.2 An Example Application of the PrimCheck Rules
Consider for example the template code tri5.
tri5 = [ (0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], [])
, (1, [INT 1, PTR 0, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[ARG 0, PRI "(<=)"]])
, (2, [ARG 1, PTR 0],
[[FUN 1 1,PTR 1,PRI "(+)"],
[INT 1, PTR 2],
[ARG 1, PRI "(-)"]])
, (2, [INT 1], [])]
The first transformation is to replace each PRI s atom for a PRIM n b atom. When
we apply the rule introPrim to each template in the program tri5, we obtain a
list of split templates. Each split template is a pair composed by a new template
with PRIMs and the empty list for integer blocks. It introduces PRIM 2 True for
the logical primitives, and PRIM 2 False for the arithmetic ones, where 2 is the
arity of the primitive application.
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primCheck [[ t ]]⇒ fix(primReduce(primIntro [[ t ]]))
where
primReduce st = primApply(emitApply(st))
pri2prim [[ a ]]⇒
PRIM 2 False , if a ∈ {PRI (+),PRI (-)}
PRIM 2 True , if a ∈ {PRI (<=),PRI (==),PRI (/=)}
a ,otherwise
primIntroApp [[ a1, ..., an ]]⇒ pri2prim [[ a1 ]], ..., pri2prim [[ an ]]
primIntro [[ (arity, ap, ap1, ..., apn) ]]⇒ ((arity, ap′, aps′), [ ])
where
ap′ = primIntroApp [[ ap ]]
aps′ = primIntroApp [[ ap1 ]], ..., primIntroApp [[ apn ]]
primApplyApp aps [[ a1, ..., an ]] ⇒
(a1, ..., an, [ ]) , if ∃i, j, p, q : isPrim ai ∧ (aj = PTR p) ∧ isPrim apspq
splitPrimApp [[ a1, ..., an ]] ,otherwise
primApply [[ st ]]⇒
st , if ∀ i : ¬isPrim ai ∧ ∀ i, j : ¬isPrim apij
Fail , if ∃ i : isPrim api1 ∨ isPrim a1





((arity, ap, ap1, ..., apn), ints) = st
(ap′, ints0) = primApplyApp aps [[ ap ]]
(ap′i, intsi) = primApplyApp aps [[ api ]], 1 <= i <= n
ints′ = ints0++ints1++...++intsn++ints
splitPrimApp [[ a1, ..., an ]]⇒
(a1, ..., an, [ ]) , if ∀ i : ¬isPrim ai
((PRIM (m-1) b, ai+1, ..., an), ints) , if (∀j : 1 <= j < i,¬isPrim aj)
∧ ai = PRIM m b
where
ints = [ ] , if i = 2 ∧ isInt a1
ints = a1, ..., ai−1 ,otherwise
Figure 4.3: Rules to reduce primitives in PrimCheck (I).
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inline [[ ((arity, ap, aps), ints) ]]⇒




ap′ = inlinePtrApp aps [[ ap ]]
aps′i = inlinePtrApp aps [[ apsi ]], 1 <= i <= n
inlinePtrApp aps [[ a1, ..., an ]]⇒
inlinePtrAtom aps [[ a1 ]], ..., inlinePtrAtom aps [[ an ]]
inlinePtrAtom aps [[ a ]] ⇒
apsi , if a = PTR i ∧ soloPrim apsi
a ,otherwise
nullsoloPrims [[ ((arity, ap, aps1, ...apsn), ints) ]] ⇒
((arity, ap, aps′1, ...aps
′
n), ints)
[ ] , if soloPrim apsi
aps′i ,otherwise
soloPrim [[ a1...an ]] ⇒ n = 1 ∧ isPrim a1
isPrim [[ a ]]⇒ a = PRIM n t
Figure 4.4: Rules to reduce primitives in PrimCheck (II).
emitApply [[ st ]]⇒ ((arity, ap′, ap′1, ..., ap′n), ints′)
where
((arity, ap, ap1, ..., apn), ints) = st
(ap′, ints0) = splitEmitApp [[ ap ]]
(ap′i, intsi) = splitEmitApp [[ api ]], 1 <= i <= n
ints′ = ints0++ints1++...++intsn++ints
splitEmitApp [[ a1, ..., an ]]⇒
(a1, ..., an, [ ]) , if ∀ i : ¬isEmit ai
((INT 0, ai+i, ..., an), ints) , if (∀j : 1 <= j <= i,¬isEmit aj)
∧ isEmitai
where
ints = [ ] , if i = 2 ∧ isInt a1
ints = a1, ..., ai−1 ,otherwise
Figure 4.5: Rules to reduce primitives in PrimCheck (III).
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⇒ by application of introPrim
[ ((0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], []) , [])
, ((1, [INT 1, PTR 0, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[ARG 0, PRIM 2 True]]) , [])
, ((2, [ARG 1, PTR 0],
[[FUN 1 1,PTR 1,PRIM 2 False],
[INT 1, PTR 2],
[ARG 1, PRIM 2 False]]) , [])
, ((2, [INT 1], [])],[]), , [])
]
The next step is to see where there are primitives PRIM n b in each applica-
tion. Each initial sequence of atoms before a PRIM n b in an application is ex-
tracted to become an integer block. In addition, the PRIM atom itself reduces to
PRIM (n-1) b.
The primApply rule is applied to each split template for tri5. It first checks where
the PRIM n b occurs. Using the splitPrimApp rule : it splits the template,
separating the int block and reduces the arity n by one in the primitive.
⇒ by application of primApply (STAGE I)
[ ((0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], []) , [])
, ((1, [INT 1, PTR 0, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[PRIM 1 True]]) , [[ARG 0]])
, ((2, [ARG 1, PTR 0],
[[PRIM 1 False],
[INT 1, PTR 2],
[PRIM 1 False]]) , [[FUN 1 1, PTR 1],[ARG 1]])
, ((2, [INT 1], [])],[]), , [])
]
Once the primitives are reduced and splitting is done, we proceed to inline the
pointers to applications of the singleton form [PRIM n b]. The inlined applica-
tions are replaced by empty [ ] applications, preserving the indices of the off-spine
applications.
⇒ by application of inlining
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[ ((0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], []) , [])
, ((1, [INT 1, PRIM 1 True, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[]]) , [[ARG 0]])
, ((2, [ARG 1, PRIM 1 False],
[[],
[INT 1,PRIM 1 False],
[]]) , [[FUN 1 1, PTR 1],[ARG 1]])
, ((2, [INT 1], [])],[]), , [])]
Notice that when a candidate int block is a literal INT n, it is not appended to
the integer blocks. The reason for that is that it does not make too much sense to
compute the type of an int if we already know it is an int. The reduction of the
arity of the primitives reaches zero :
⇒ by application of primApply (STAGE II)
[ ((0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], []) , [])
, ((1, [PRIM 0 True, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[]]) , [[ARG 0]])
, ((2, [PRIM 0 False],
[[],
[PRIM 0 False],
[]]) , [[FUN 1 1, PTR 1],[ARG 1],[ARG 1]])
, ((2, [INT 1], [])],[]) , [])]
When the arity of the primitives reaches zero the primitive atom is changed to
one of two atoms : either a new BOOL atom for logical primitives or INT 0 for
arithmetic primitives.
⇒ by application of primApply (STAGE II)
[ ((0, [FUN 1 1, INT 5], []) , [])
, ((1, [BOOL, TAB 2 2 1,ARG 0],
[[]]) , [[ARG 0]])
, ((2, [INT 0],
[[],
[INT 0],
[]]) , [FUN 1 1, PTR 1],[ARG 1],[ARG 1]])
, ((2, [INT 1], [])],[]), , [])]
Chapter 4. 63
prop_primFree t => all notPrimi (atoms (PrimCheck t))
where
atoms ((n,ap,aps),ints) = ap ++ concat (aps ++ ints)
notPrimi (PRIM n b) = False
notPrimi _ = True
prop_preserveApps t => length offsApps == length offsApps’
where
offsApps = getApps t
offsApps’ = getApps $ fst (fromJust $ PrimCheck t)
getApps (a,app,apps) = apps
Figure 4.6: Some properties of PrimCheck.
As we can see, we have eliminated all the primitives from the template code and
isolated the integer blocks representing their arguments. The result types of each
primitive application are reflected in the BOOL and INT 0 atoms.
4.3.3 Properties of PrimCheck
Figure 4.6 shows two expected properties when we apply PrimCheck to a given
template. We can test these properties, for example, by mutating the testing
programs.
The first property, prop primFree, is that at the end of the primitive analysis
the split template must be free of any primitive atoms. The main objective of
PrimCheck is to eliminate the primitive applications from the template code, so
this is a natural property to check.
The other property, prop preserveApps, is that the number of off-spine applica-
tions in a template is preserved. There must be the same number in the original
template and the one after PrimCheck transformation. Notice that we only take
into account the number of applications not their contents.
4.3.4 Measuring the Effectiveness of PrimCheck
In order to measure the effectiveness of the primitive analysis, in Table 4.2 we
show some results from the testing of PrimCheck over a set of mutations of the
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Table 4.2: Mutations (200-All-PrimCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck OK GP BP NT
queens 132 118 35 3 72 14
queens2 107 103 32 1 68 4
ordlist 113 112 34 0 77 1
mss 104 99 8 0 87 4
parts 102 92 21 1 63 9
braun 118 118 13 0 103 2
adjoxo 126 122 40 0 80 2
permsort 130 126 19 2 105 4
sudoku 107 105 7 0 95 3
while 146 144 22 2 117 7
tautology 113 110 15 1 94 2
cichelli2 115 106 11 0 89 6
different benchmark programs. For all of them we would like the column GP to
be close to zero, as we do not want the PrimCheck analysis to stop well-behaved
programs. One advantage of this analysis is that the programs with problems in
the primitives can be stopped without using the type-checking analysis. The size
of the set of BP at this stage is not important. After the PrimCheck is applied
to the template code, the main goal of the type-checking analysis is to reduce the
number of bad programs allowed (BP) ideally without increasing the number of
good programs stopped (GP).
In Table 4.2 we show the results for 200 mutations of type All. The mutation
type All includes Increment + Delete + Swapping type of mutations.
For the program queens, for example, we have 132 well-formed mutations. Only
35 programs evaluate successfully under the operational semantics, and 118 pro-
grams are valid under PrimCheck analysis. Notice that GP is three. In fact there
are only two stopped good programs. Remember that the mutations are cho-
sen randomly; in this case we have taken one mutation twice. GP is not zero,
only because in the operational semantics the special rule for primitives means
we can have the application in two different orders [PRI (+),ARG 0,ARG 1] or
[ARG 0,ARG 1,PRI (+)], and obtain the same result. In the PrimCheck analysis
we have not taken into account this situation. BP is quite big. At this stage of
checking that is no surprise, remember that we are only dealing with problems in
primitives. Finally the number of non-terminating programs in NT is 14.
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4.4 TyreCheck
In brief TyreCheck derives a collection of term-type equations from coded tem-
plates and then tries to solve them. In this section we explain first the type
language and the mechanism to find a solution of a set of equations. Then in
§4.4.4 we explore the rules for solving equations when we have algebraic data
types. Finally, the mechanism to derive the collection of equations from the code
and its formalism is described in §4.4.6.
4.4.1 Type-Terms
Before we discuss how to solve a system of equations, we need to introduce the
terms that may occur as left-hand side or right-hand sides. In Figure 4.7 we have
the type-term definition — we will refer to terms or types interchangeably from
now on. A term may be a function t→ t, or a term variable denoted by v, or an
integer Int.
In Reduceron code the high-level algebraic data types are compiled to constructors
with arity and index. There is no explicit type information about algebraic data
types, and atomically constructors from different types may be indistinguishable.
We introduce in our type language a special type to encode algebraic data types,
represented by alg ics ⊕ ext. The arguments of alg are as follows. In the first
place we a have a sequence ics of pairs (i ,~t) each representing a constructor of
the type. The first component i of the pair is an index and the second is a list of
argument types. The second argument ext represents the possible extension [91]
of this algebraic data type. An extension is a pair (v,~i) where v is the variable
which will contain the extended algebraic data type, and the list ~i contains the
lacks information that represents the indexes of which alternatives are lacking in a
overall algebraic data type. When we have a algebraic data type with an extension
we will call it open.
In the case when we know the exact number of alternatives in an algebraic data
type, we will make use of the type constructor alg
−→
ics. This type cannot be
extended and we will refer it as closed in the future.
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t = v | Int | t → t | alg −→ics ⊕ ext
| alg −→ics
ics = i × ~t
ext = v × ~i
Figure 4.7: Type-terms definition.
Extensible Types and Extension Variables The idea of extending algebraic
data types is needed because in low-level code for constructor applications we do
not have any type information that allows us to know about other constructors
for the same data type. The full data type will be the sum of a type for this
construction and some extension of this type for other constructions. We know the
index of the constructor being applied and the extension must lack any constructor
with that index.
On the other hand, when we have an application with a case-table argument, we
know how many components the case subject has. Their types can be inferred
from the templates for alternatives.
The role of the extension variable is to provide a way of referring to a possible
extension of a data type. In our algorithm the extension variable is needed. For
instance, to close a data type we add an equation assigning an empty algebraic
data type to the extension variable.
4.4.2 Colmerauer’s Method to Solve Recursive Equations
Our solver is based on the rules for solving recursive equations between simple
applicative terms, given by Colmerauer [19] in his paper titled “Prolog and Infinite
Trees”. That means that we can work with recursive functions or recursive data
types. All we need is to pass that recursive information encoded in the system of
equations to be solved. However, the solver from Colmerauer only presents simple
term constructors. In our case we need a mechanism to extend it to handle alg
terms in our type-term language.
Colmerauer’s method uses five reduction rules as follows:
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• Compaction. Eliminate all the equations containing variable x in the left
hand side and in the right hand side only the variable x is present.
• Variable Elimination. If the variable x and the variable y are distinct vari-
ables, and the equation x=y is in the system, and x has other occurrences
in the system, then replace all these other occurrences of the variable x by
the occurrences of the variable y.
• Variable Anteposition. If there is an equation where its left hand side is a
term which is not a variable and the right hand side is a variable x, then
swap the order of the terms. The left hand side becomes the variable x and
the right hand side the other term.
• Confrontation. If in the system of equations there is x = t1 and x = t2,
where the size of t1 is ≤ the size of t2, then replace the two equations by x
= t1 and t1 = t2.
• Splitting. If the equation is of the form f(t1, ..., tn) = g(r1, ..., rn), then if
f=g replace it by t1 = r1, t2 = r2,..., tn = rn, or if f 6= g fail.
4.4.3 Algebraic Data Types
In Reduceron template code it is possible to use constructors to build low-level rep-
resentations of high-level data structures like lists or trees for instance. The atoms
CON and TAB in particular, encode computation involving algebraic data types.
The work from Colmerauer only deals with function terms and term variables. In
this section we explain how to solve an equation involving possibly recursive data
types. First we give an informal approach; then we shall formalise it as a rule.
From the language of terms in Figure 4.7, we have that an algebraic data type is
represented by the term ics where ics is a sequence of pairs representing indices
and lists of argument types for constructors. In some cases we want to allow some
extensions for the data types, we denote this idea by ⊕ ext. For example the type
for the atom BOOL is an algebraic data type containing two constructors. This
type cannot be extended.
[(0,[ ]) , (1,[ ])]
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-----------------> [(0,[]) , (1,[])]
|
case sub of




alt1 -> False ------> [(0,[])] (+) (v2,[0]) --
Figure 4.8: Case example.
Now suppose we have an alternative in a case expression, the result type of this
alternative should not be restricted. For example the type of a constant False
compiled to an atom CON 0 0, is encoded as:
[(0,[ ])] ⊕ (ve,[0])
This term represents an algebraic data type which includes at least a 0-arity con-
structor with index 0. The possibility of other constructors is represented by
the variable extension ve. Any algebraic data type assigned to ve must lack any
constructor with index zero.
Let’s outline how this idea works form in Figure 4.8. The case subject sub is
assigned a closed algebraic data type, in this example it includes two constructors
for alternatives alt0 and alt1. However, the types for True and False must be
open allowing the possibility of an extension, so that there can be a solution to
an equation requiring these two types be equal. The solution is to assign the type
of False to the variable extension v1, this is : v1 = [(0, [ ])] ⊕ (ve, [1, 0]) , a new
variable extension is added denoted by ve. The type can be extended by any type
lacking constructors [1,0]. The solution also assigns the type including True to
the extension variable v2 of False as follows: v2 = [(1, [ ])] ⊕ (ve, [1, 0]) and the
explanation is similar to the previous one. A minor but important note is that
extension variables ve must be fresh variables and the same variable occurs in the
type for alternative.
4.4.4 Rules for Solving Algebraic Data Types Equations
Now it is time to formalise these previous ideas for solving equations between
algebraic data types. Figure 4.9 gives a reduction rule for equations between
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two algebraic data types. We combine the algebraic type-form with and without
extensions by introducing an empty extension. Here we use the convention icsL
to denote the index-constructor pairs ics in the left data type. Similarly, we use
the same convention for the data type in the right icsR.
The exL and exR are the variable extension-lack information pairs. If we do
not need to “extend” our data type, the extend information is not given. If we
can extend the data type, then the extension information is a pair of a variable
extension and the set of the lack information which contains the indexes of the
constructors. We can extract the lack information using the auxiliary function
getlks to extract the second component of the extension.
We need first, to detect which ics exists in one data type and not in the other. The
set difficsL are the existing ics in icsL and not in icsR. For the set difficsR we
apply the same principle but the other way around.
In general, the rule has two possibilities, one is a failure and the other possibility
is to reduce the original equation to a set of derived equations.
The rule fails under any of the following conditions :
1. The types both have a constructor with the same index i but different arities.
2. There is a non-empty set difficsL (or difficsR ), but the right (or left) data
type is closed.
3. There is an index in the iL (or iR) that is already in the lacks set lsR (or
lsL).
4. Both difficsL and difficsR sets are empty, and both types are open but their
lacks sets are not equal.
Otherwise the rule succeeds. Derived equations are obtained as follows:
1. For each ics appearing in the left and also appearing in the right we construct
equations between corresponding argument types.
2. We take into account the remaining constructors not found in that intersec-
tion as follows:
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(a) If difficsL and difficsR are both non-empty we create two equations.
The first assigns to the extension variable exR of the right a data type
derived from the left. The new data type contains only the left con-
structors difficsL . The new extension information has a fresh variable,
and the union of the two lacks sets. The second equation is similarly
obtained, but with left and right exchanged.
(b) If difficsL is not empty but difficsR is empty we extend the data type
of the right by assigning to its extension variable the data type derived
from the left. It is a new data type containing the constructors in
difficsL , with extension information the same as the data type in the
left. This step only creates one equation.
(c) Similarly if difficsL is empty but difficsR is non-empty.
(d) The fourth possibility is when difficsL and difficsR are both empty.
There are four sub-cases based on the extension information:
i. If both types are closed then we do not need to add any extra
equation.
ii. If the type on the left is closed but the one in the right is open,
a new equation assigns to the variable extension on the right an
empty data type, with no constructors and no extension.
iii. Similarly, if the data type on the left is open and the one on the
right is closed.
iv. Finally, if both data types are open, we create an equation between
the extension variable on the left and the extension variable on the
right.
4.4.5 Collecting Equations for length Function: An Infor-
mal Approach
This section uses a small example, a function to calculate the length of a given
list, to explain informally the process of collecting equations for a given template.
In Figure 4.10 we describe several stages of this process applied to the template
code for the length function.
Before we proceed to type-check the template code, the code is checked by Atom-
Check and PrimCheck analysis. The result is a split template, containing the
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Given equation:
alg icsL ⊕ exL = alg icsR ⊕ exR
Fail under the following condition:
if ∃(iL, csL) ∈ icsL, (iR, csR) ∈ icsR : iL = iR ∧ |csL| 6= |csR|
∨
(difficsL 6= ∅ ∧ (null exR ∨ ∃idlackL ∈ lacksL : idlackL ∈ lacksR))
∨
(difficsR 6= ∅ ∧ (null exL ∨ ∃idlackR ∈ lacksR : idlackR ∈ lacksL))
∨
(difficsL = ∅ ∧ difficsR = ∅ ∧ ¬null exL ∧ ¬null exR ∧ lacksL 6= lacksR)
where
difficsL = {(iL, cL) | (iL, cL) ∈ icsL, iL 6∈ icsR}
difficsR = {(iR, cR) | (iR, cR) ∈ icsR, iR 6∈ icsL}
(veL, lacksL) = exL
(veR, lacksR) = exR
Otherwise, succeed replacing the equation by the following new equations:
ssj = tsj ,∀i, j : (i, ss) ∈ icsL, (i, ts) ∈ icsR, 1 ≤ j ≤ |ss|
veR = alg difficsL (v, lacksL ∪ lacksR) , if difficsL 6= ∅ ∧ difficsR 6= ∅
veL = alg difficsR (v, lacksR ∪ lacksL) ,ditto
veR = alg difficsL exL , if difficsL 6= ∅ ∧ difficsR = ∅
veL = alg difficsR exR , if difficsL = ∅ ∧ difficsR 6= ∅
alg [ ] = veL , if difficsL = ∅ ∧ difficsR = ∅ ∧ ¬null exL ∧ null exR
veR = alg [ ] , if difficsL = ∅ ∧ difficsR = ∅ ∧ null exL ∧ ¬null exR
veL = veR , if difficsL = ∅ ∧ difficsR = ∅ ∧ ¬null exL ∧ ¬null exR
Figure 4.9: Rule to solve equations between two algebraic data types.
templates and the isolated integer blocks. A dependency analysis is performed to
obtain the connected components in dependency order. Even if this appears to be
a small example, it contains some interesting structures to deal with. For example,
it contains a TAB i j k atom which represents references to other templates. In
addition, we have a recursive call for the function length denoted by FUN 1 1 in
the second template.
The first step is to calculate and give skeleton types to each template, see Figure
4.11. These skeleton types are just chains of term variables based on the arity of
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The length code definition in Flite :
length (Cons x xs) = 1 + length xs
length Nil = 0
The original template for length function :
(1,[ARG 0,TAB 1 2 0],[])
(3,[FUN 1 1,ARG 1,PTR 0],[[INT 1,PRI "(+)"]])
(1,[INT 0],[])
The split template for the length function after PrimCheck :
((1,[ARG 0,TAB 1 2 0],[]),[])
((3,[INT 0],[[]]),[[FUN 1 1,ARG 1]])
((1,[INT 0],[]),[])
The reordered split template after dependency analysis :
((3,[INT 0],[[]]),[[FUN 1 1,ARG 1]])
((1,[INT 0],[]),[])
((1,[ARG 0,TAB 1 2 0],[]),[])
Figure 4.10: Processing the length function’s templates.
((3,[INT 0],[[]]),[[FUN 1 1,ARG 1]])
a → b → c → r1
((1,[INT 0],[]),[])
d → r2
((1,[ARG 0,TAB 1 2 0],[]),[])
e → r3
Figure 4.11: Skeleton types for the length function’s split templates.
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each template.
Once we have the skeleton types, we calculate the equations for the templates rep-
resenting alternatives. In our example the alternatives are the first two templates
(after reordering by dependency) as shown in Figure 4.12.
Recursive Case Template. For the template number one, which is a template
of arity three, we assign the initial skeleton type as follows a → b → c → r1, a
functional type based on the arity. We use the letter “r” subscripted as convention
for the result type.
For the template one (3,[INT 0],[[ ]]), we only have as result type an Int. However,
the type of the integer blocks denoted by [[FUN 1 1,ARG 1]] is an integer appli-
cation of the function to the argument numbered one. We use the subscript “i”
for type variables inside of integer blocks. In the equation bi = b → di notice the
b, which is the same “b” as in the skeleton type a → b → c → r1.
Note here we have a recursive call for length function in [FUN 1 1,ARG 1], the
type for FUN 1 1 is the same type as the top-level definition of the template
number one e → r3.
Type Invariance and Recursion. We use this invariant in our type- system:
The recursive calls of a given function must have the same type as the type of the
top level function definition of that function.
Base Case Template. The second template ((1,[INT 0],[ ]),[ ]) is easy to collect the
equations from. The skeleton type for this template is a function d → r2. The r2
is the result type and it is Int. There are no integer blocks at all, so there are no
further equations from this template.
Main Template. Finally, and the most interesting part, there is the calculation of
the equations for the main template for the length function itself. The skeleton
type function for length is e → f where e is the type of the argument and f is the
result type.
In Figure 4.13 first we detect that this template contains a case table application.
This requires a different treatment from function applications. In the applica-
tion example [ARG 0,TAB 2 2 0] everything before a TAB 2 2 0 atom is the case
subject. In this example it is just a single argument ARG 0. In the TAB i j k
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((3,[INT 0],[[]]),[[FUN 1 1,ARG 1]])
a → b → c → r1
r1 = Int
ai = e→ r3















f = e → r3
Figure 4.13: Template coding of the case expression in length.
constructor in this example the j component refers to the number of case alter-
natives, here there are two. The k component is zero, which tells us there are
no auxiliary arguments in alternative templates (these would correspond to free
variables in high-level case alternatives). The overall type is the result type of all
the alternatives.
The type of the top level definition of length is defined by the equation f=e → r3.
Then the equations for f are extracted in the following sequence:
• The type of ARG 0 is the type of e, which is the case subject type.
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• Then, we construct this type as an algebraic data type, which contains two
components (zero and one). The component one is just an empty compo-
nent, from d → r2 we see that d is just a table. In the operational semantics
§3.4 the table arguments are not used when a case alternative is reduced.
The component zero contains the type variables a and b, which are taken
from a → b → c → r1, where c is the table placeholder and r1 is the re-
sult. Notice here the term variables in the components of case subject type
are just instances of the types for the templates one and two as follows
e = [(0,[a , b]),(1,[ ])]
• Now, for each alternative we extract the result. In our example the result
types are Int and r2. We assign those types to two fresh variables to con-
struct two equations as follows:
g = Int
h = r2
We extract all the type equations in the result type of each alternative.
These equations are previously formed when we extract the types for the
applications, for each application we generate two equations.
r1 = Int
ai = e→ f
ai = b→ di
• Finally, the result types from each alternative must be the same. We con-
struct an equation g = h to make the two result types equal. Additionally,
we need to create an equation to say that the overall result type r3 is equal
to the result type of the alternatives, it is denoted by f = g where g is the
result type of one of the alternatives.
In the Figure 4.14 the final system of equations is given. The type variable t0
represents the type of template zero, which encodes the function length. When
we solve this system of equations in Figure 4.14 we obtain a simplified system as
follows:
t0 = e→ f
e = [(0, [a, e]), (1, [ ])]
f = Int
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t0 = e→ f




ai = e→ f
ai = b→ di
g = h
f = g
Figure 4.14: The final type equations extracted from template code for length.
Note the recursive structure of a list in the second equation. An algebraic data
type with two constructors indexed by zero and one. The constructor zero has two
arguments, the type variable a can be any type, and the variable e which is the
recursive term at the algebraic data type. The constructor takes no arguments.
The solution assigns to e the type of the length template argument.
We have seen in an informal way how to collect the equations for the length
function,as an example. In addition we have shown the solution for that system
of equations.
4.4.6 Rules for Collecting Equations
Here, we present the formal rules for collecting type equations from template
code. The general outcome of the collection rules in Figures 4.15 and 4.16 is a
pair (T, S), where T is the term-type which is the result type, S is the list of
term-type equations related to T. The system S can be empty. For instance, the
collected type information for an INT atom is : (Int, [ ]), where Int is the result
type, and [ ] the empty system of equations. The name of the collection rules has
the prefix convention TES meaning type-term equations system.
In order to keep track of the types for the templates, we use an environment Γ,
which is a list of pairs (i, tsys), where i is the index of a template, and tsys an
associated type-term and equation system (T, S).
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The steps to collect the equations are:
• Initialise the environment with a skeleton type for each template.
• For each template derive type-term equations from the integer blocks.
• For each template derive type-term equations from the spine application and
the off-spine applications.
• Accumulate the equations.
We define the rule TESSTemp to collect the type equations for a template, the
rule TESApply to collect equations for applications, TESAtom to collect equa-
tions for each atom. The rule TESApp accumulates the results of the application
rule. The TESCaseSubOrAtom rule checks if the atom examined is a TAB atom.
If it is, then we extract the information before and after the TAB constructor,
otherwise the atom is part of a function application.
4.4.7 Accumulating Applications
The simplest rule is the TESApp which accumulates the results from the ap-
plication rule TESApply, this rule traverses recursively all the structure of the
application, reflecting the left-associative structure of a multi-argument applica-
tion.
4.4.8 Collection of Equations in a Template
The TESSTemp rule receives a term t, system of equations s, and the environ-
ment e. From now on we will use the variable name tes or the decorated version
tes′ to refer to such a triple. Additionally the rule takes the recursive connected
components rgs and a split template.
The output of this rule has two possible alternatives:
1. If the template has only an empty spine application and an empty off-spine
applications, the rule simply yields a fresh type variable, and the empty sys-
tem of equations. This case can occur when there is an undefined template.
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For instance, when the Flite compiler generates code for the head function,
it creates automatically an alternative to handle the case when the list is
empty. From the point of view of type-checking any undefined values must
be compatible with any other type.
2. The second case is when we have a template, with a non-empty spine ap-
plication. Apart from the standard application in template code we have a
special case, when there is a TAB i j k in the list of atoms. If that occurs
then anything before the tab constructor is considered as the case subject.
In TESSTemp the rule TESCaseSubOrAtom is in charge to deal with such
situation. This rule returns a tes′ and the list of atoms in app′. Then it ac-
cumulates the applications in app′ by using TESApp. By using this process,
we eliminate the need to assign a type to a TAB as a first-class citizen atom.
4.4.9 The Application Rule.
The rule for application TESApply introduces two equations v1 = t1 and v1 =
t2 → v2, and the union of the derived system of equations s1 and s2 (See §4.4.6).
The type-term variable v2 contains the result type.
The atomic rules TESAtom are :
• for ARG i extracts the type of i from the environment.
• for FUN n i uses TESFun to extract the type i from the environment. De-
pending on the context the extraction can yield an instance or a copy from
the environment.
• for INT n, assigns as result type the Int type, and an empty set of type
equations.
• for BOOL extracts a closed algebraic data type with two constructors, and
an empty set of type equations.
• for CON j k, uses the rule TESCon to extract a functional type based on
the arity j, whose result type is an open algebraic type pairing k with the
sequence of term variables that occurs in the functional type.
• for PTR i the rule for pointers TESPtr, extracts the type and the system
of equations of the off-spine application at index i.
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The rule for a case subject TESCaseSub contains the construction of the alter-
native types from the values of the case alternative templates. The free-variables
arguments following the TAB atom are equated with free variable types of each
case alternative. The case subject is calculated with the information of the case
alternatives. We equate the case subject calculated in TESCaseSub rule casesub
with the case subject casesub calculated in the rule TESCaseSubOrAtom. The
result type of the case structure must be equal to the result types in the alterna-
tives, in our case we select the first variable result vr0.
4.4.10 Type Equations for Integer Blocks.
The int-block rule evaluates each application in an integer block and assign an Int
type to those singleton applications containing just one argument. In that way,
any integer arguments in int-blocks now have an explicit integer type.
4.5 Measuring the Effectiveness of TyreCheck
In Chapter 3 we described the machinery to measure the effectiveness of our static
checkers. Here we explore the results of comparing TyreCheck against RunCheck.
The overall process of testing is as follows :
• From an original well-behaved program in template code produce n muta-
tions, then extract randomly m mutations.
• Keep only the well-formed mutations that are passed by AtomCheck.
• The filtered well-formed mutations are analysed by PrimCheck.
• If PrimCheck succeeds then the mutation is analysed by TyreCheck, other-
wise the mutation is stopped after PrimCheck analysis.
• If TyreCheck can find a solution for the equations collected for each function
definition, the mutation is classified well-typed, otherwise it is considered
ill-typed.
• Evaluate the well-formed mutations by RunCheck (operational semantics).
See §3.5.
Chapter 4. 80
TESSTemp [[ st ]]⇒
(v, [ ]) , if ap = [ ] ∧ aps = [ ]
TESApp tes′ [[ app′ ]] ,otherwise
where
(tes′, app′) = TESCaseSubOrAtom [[ st ]]
((a, ap, aps), ibs) = st
v is fresh
TESCaseSubOrAtom tes [[ ((ari, a1 · · · an, apps), ibs) ]]
if ∀j : ¬isTab aj ⇒
(TESAtom [[ a1 ]], a2 · · · an)
if ∀m : 1 ≤ m < i,¬isTab am ∧ ai = TAB j k i ⇒
(TESCaseSub [j · · · (j + k − 1)] l (cst, fvts), ai+l+1 · · · an)
where
cst = TESApp ( [[ TESAtom [[ a1 ]] ]]a2 · · · ai−1)
fvts = TESAtom [[ ai+1 ]], · · · ,TESAtom [[ ai−l ]]
TESCaseSub tid0, · · · , tidn l [[ cst, fvts ]]⇒ (vr0, eqs)
where
(v0i → ...vni−1i → fv0i → ...fv(l−1)i → vri , si) = Γ tidi
, 0 ≤ i ≤ n
casesub = alg (0, [v00, ..., vn0]) , ..., (k − 1, [v0k−1, ..., vnk−1])
pairsRes = {vri−1 = vri | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
pairFvs = {fvi(j−1) = fvij | 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ 0 ≤ i < l}
pairFvsAltTab = {fvi0 = fvsts0i | 0 ≤ i < l}
(cst′, css) = cst
(fss0...fssn, fvsts0...fvstsn) = fvts
eqs = css ∪ (cst′, casesub) ∪ s0 ∪ · · · ∪ sn ∪ pairRes
∪ pairFvs ∪ pairFvsAltTab ∪ fss0...fssn
Figure 4.15: Rules to extract equations from Template code.
• At the end there are six sets in our testing as described in Chapter 3:
– The set OK is the set of well-behaved programs in RunCheck
– The set SC is the set of well-typed programs satisfying AtomCheck,
PrimCheck and TyreCheck.
– The set BP is the set of bad programs allowed by static analysis but
stopped during the execution by the run-time system.
– The set GP is the set of well-behaved programs but stopped by the static
analysis techniques.
– The set NT is the set of (apparently) non-terminating programs.
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TESApp tes [[ a1 · · · an ]]⇒
TESApply [[ (· · · (TESApply tes [[ a1 ]]) · · · ) ]]an
TESApply (t1, s1) [[ a ]] ⇒ (v2, s3)
where
(t2, s2) = TESAtom [[ a ]]
s3 = {(v1 = t1), (v1 = t2 → v2)} ∪ s1 ∪ s2
v1, v2 are fresh
TESAtom [[ ARG x ]] ⇒ Γx
TESAtom [[ INT i ]] ⇒ (Int,[ ])
TESAtom [[ BOOL ]] ⇒ ([(0,[ ]), (1,[ ])],[ ])
TESAtom [[ CON i j ]] ⇒ TESCon j k
TESAtom [[ FUN j k ]] ⇒ TESFun j
TESAtom [[ PTR x ]] ⇒ TESPtr x
TESCon j k ⇒ (v0 → v1 → vj−1 → (alg[(k, v0, ..., vj−1)](vext, k)), [ ])
where
v0 · · · vj−1, vext are fresh
TESPtr ((ari, app, ap1 · · · apn), ibs) x⇒ TESSTemp [[ ((ari, apx, ap1 · · · apn), ibs) ]]
TESFun id⇒
Γ id , if Γid =⊥
instance id Γ ,otherwise
Figure 4.16: Rules to extract type-equation systems from Template code,
given type environment Γ.
– The set AC is the set of well-formed programs checked by AtomCheck.
4.5.1 Mutations : Delete
In this section we measure how effective PrimCheck and TyreCheck are when we
test them against mutations in which we only delete an arbitrary atom. In Table
4.3 the results for testing PrimCheck are shown. In previous §4.3.4 the set of
good programs GP was close to zero, in this test we preserve that result. For this
experiment the amount of mutations is 200. By deleting atoms we can damage the
code seriously. The number of well-behaved programs (OK) is small in comparison
with the number of well-formed mutations (AtomCheck).
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Table 4.3: Mutations (200-Delete-PrimCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 122 121 6 0 115 6
queens 117 105 4 0 101 13
queens2 193 186 18 1 169 7
ordlist 128 128 27 0 101 2
mss 111 105 1 0 104 10
parts 117 96 9 0 87 10
braun 173 171 8 0 163 6
adjoxo 194 182 9 0 173 6
tautology 182 171 3 0 168 18
cichelli2 188 183 10 0 173 12
Table 4.4: Mutations (200-Delete-TyreCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck TyreCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 122 121 7 6 3 4 6
queens 117 105 7 4 0 3 13
queens2 193 186 37 18 2 21 7
ordlist 128 128 6 27 23 2 2
mss 111 105 11 1 0 10 10
parts 117 96 23 9 1 15 10
braun 173 171 5 8 5 2 6
adjoxo 194 182 11 9 6 8 6
tautology 182 171 0 3 3 0 18
cichelli2 188 183 7 10 4 1 12
It is convenient to see the behaviour of PrimCheck and TyreCheck together. In
Table 4.4 we show the results from applying first PrimCheck and then TyreCheck
to the same set of mutations used in Table 4.3. The main goal is to reduce the
number of bad programs BP yet preserve as many as possible of the good programs
GP.
In mss there is a reduction in set BP from 104 to 10, in this case the set of
BP is [95,100,75,95,72,72,72,72,100,75]. As we can see there are repeated
mutations, then the actual set is [95,100,75,72]. Even if the numbers in the set
are duplicated in mss, the gain in the BP set when PrimCheck + TyreCheck are
applied together is in factor of 10 times, than applying PrimCheck solely.
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Table 4.5: Mutations (200-Increment-PrimCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 137 133 40 0 93 2
queens 158 154 54 0 100 3
queens2 155 155 67 0 88 5
ordlist 149 146 70 2 78 2
mss 149 149 44 0 105 5
parts 131 131 48 0 83 8
braun 139 139 45 0 94 7
adjoxo 164 164 78 0 86 2
tautology 150 149 41 0 108 2
cichelli2 152 148 44 0 104 3
Table 4.6: Mutations (200-Increment-TyreCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck TyreCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 137 133 30 40 15 5 2
queens 158 154 51 54 6 3 3
queens2 155 155 73 67 11 17 5
ordlist 149 146 62 70 8 0 2
mss 149 149 51 44 1 8 5
parts 131 131 52 48 5 9 8
braun 139 139 40 45 9 4 7
adjoxo 164 164 64 78 23 9 2
tautology 150 149 41 41 6 6 2
cichelli2 152 148 45 44 5 6 3
4.5.2 Mutations : Increment
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 gives the results when the mutations are increments in the
numeric values of the arguments of the atom constructors. Notice here how the
set OK is bigger than in the mutations where we delete atoms. If we see the average
of BP in 4.6, it is 7 bad programs allowed by PrimCheck + TyreCheck, and the
average of well-typed programs is 51 (in column TyreCheck), that means that the
static checkers are allowing around 1/7 of bad programs from the total of well-
typed programs. And the average of GP stopped is almost 9, which means that we
are stopping less than 1/6 of all the well-typed programs.
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Table 4.7: Mutations (200-All-PrimCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 169 164 39 0 125 2
queens 162 148 49 0 99 7
queens2 161 156 44 3 115 6
ordlist 166 163 47 1 117 2
mss 160 156 32 1 125 5
parts 149 144 55 2 91 12
braun 162 160 34 2 128 7
adjoxo 172 166 66 0 100 3
tautology 170 166 40 2 128 5
cichelli2 166 161 45 0 116 7
Table 4.8: Mutations (200-All-TyreCheck)
Program AtomCheck PrimCheck TyreCheck OK GP BP NT
permsort 169 164 32 39 14 7 2
queens 162 148 43 49 8 2 7
queens2 161 156 45 44 10 11 6
ordlist 166 163 36 47 12 1 2
mss 160 156 34 32 5 7 5
parts 149 144 52 55 16 13 12
braun 162 160 31 34 8 5 7
adjoxo 172 166 58 66 19 11 3
tautology 170 166 34 40 9 3 5
cichelli2 166 161 44 45 8 7 7
4.5.3 Mutations : All
The results when we apply our static methods to a set of mutations in which we
combine Deletion, Swapping and Increment All are in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. The
damage produced by this kind of mutations is something in between deletion and
increment. The average of well-typed programs is 41, and the average of BP is 7,
that means that we are allowing 1/6 of bad programs.
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4.5.4 Bad Guys and Good Guys
Here we discuss some examples of BP (Bad Programs) and GP (Good Programs).
First, let us see the reasons for why some ill-behaved programs are allowed by
TyreCheck. Let’s see in detail the problems in the program tautology. Consider
some mutations [242,564,164,350] in Figure 4.17 all of which belong to BP. The
mutations presented here, are of the style ALL, which includes Swap + Delete +
Increment.
For mutation 242, the function FUN 2 40 is the second alternative of a case table.
The arity of the alternative in this example is the same as the arity of the case
table function. Moreover, the result type of that alternative is a type-term variable,
which can unify with any other type.
In the mutation 564, we have a similar problem, the function FUN 1 31 is again
a branch of a case table, and has the same arity as the case table function, repre-
sented by FUN 1 29. And the result type, in this example is compatible with the
result type of the complete case table function.
The mutation 164, is a similar case, except that here the TAB 11 2 2 makes ref-
erence to one branch of the complete case table function.
The mutation 350, is obvious, from the point of view of type-checking the logical
primitives (==) and (/=) have the same type.
In summary the first three mutations in this example, the main problem is when a
function (via TAB or FUN) jumps to a case alternative, and that case alternative
is valid in terms of type-checking.
4.5.5 Tangled Functional Types
There are some term-type-graph tangled “solutions” that are perfectly valid, for
instance t = t → t. However, from the point of view of type-checking those tangled
solutions yield bad programs allowed by the solver. One possible way to stop bad
programs, is to detect when these tangled solutions are present, allowing only
recursion in algebraic data types.
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(3,[FUN 2 38,PTR 0,PTR 1],[..]), original
(3,[FUN 2 40,PTR 0,PTR 1],[..])) mutation 242
((1,[FUN 2 41,PTR 2,PTR 4],[[FUN 1 19,ARG 0], original
[FUN 1 29,PTR 0],
...]),
(1,[FUN 2 41,PTR 2,PTR 4],[[FUN 1 19,ARG 0],
[FUN 1 31,PTR 0], mutation 564
...]))
((4,[FUN 2 7,ARG 3,ARG 0,TAB 8 2 2,ARG 3,ARG 1],[]), original
(4,[FUN 2 7,ARG 3,ARG 0,TAB 11 2 2,ARG 3,ARG 1],[])) mutation 164
((1,[INT 0,PTR 0,TAB 26 2 1,ARG 0],[[ARG 0,PRI "(==)"]]), original
(1,[INT 0,PTR 0,TAB 26 2 1,ARG 0],[[ARG 0,PRI "(/=)"]])) mutation 350
Figure 4.17: Well-typed but ill-behaved template code in tautology mutants.
(0,[CON 2 0,INT 97,PTR 0],[[CON 2 0,INT 98,CON 0 1]]), original
(0,[CON 2 0,INT 97,PTR 0],[[INT 98,CON 2 0,CON 0 1]]) mutation 1160
(0,[CON 2 0,INT 97,PTR 0],[[CON 2 0,INT 98,CON 0 1]]), original
(0,[INT 97,CON 2 0,PTR 0],[[CON 2 0,INT 98,CON 0 1]])) mutation 1140
(3,[CON 2 0,ARG 0,PTR 2],[[FUN 2 28,ARG 0],
[FUN 2 49,PTR 0,ARG 1]...]), original
(3,[CON 2 0,ARG 0,PTR 2],[[FUN 2 28,ARG 0],
[PTR 0,FUN 2 49,ARG 1]...])) mutation 523
((3,[FUN 2 1,ARG 0,ARG 2],[]), original
(3,[ARG 0,FUN 2 1,ARG 2],[])) mutation 224




The main contributions of this Chapter are:
• An equation based type-checker for low-level code capable of dealing with
recursive structures without explicit type information.
• A method to eliminate the need for dependent types called PrimCheck.
We have shown that it is possible to apply static analysis techniques to Reduceron
code. Even in the absence of extra annotations the results of applying PrimCheck
combined with TyreCheck can stop ill-behaved programs.
In addition, we have shown how successful the static techniques are in detecting
ill-behaved programs when we present different kinds of mutation scenarios.
In the subsequent chapters we will see the compatibility between low-level type-
checker and high-level type-checker. In addition, we will see how to make the




In this Chapter we explore the compatibility between high-level and low-level
types. The high-level type information is inferred by a type-checker for Flite. The
low-level type information is derived from the type-terms equations produced by
Reduceron TyreCheck.
The road map of this Chapter is as follows: In §5.2 we depict our overall idea for
a principle of compatibility, in §5.3 we give the language for high-level types, then
in §5.4 we describe the language of the low-level types. In §5.5 we give the details
to translate high-level types to low-level types. In §5.6 we give some examples of
how we translate from high-level types to low-level term-types. Finally, in §5.7 we
give a discussion and in §5.8 we present some results from the experiments.
5.2 Principles of Compatibility
In Figure 5.1 the source code is represented by the bullet circle in the upper-left
corner. At program level, we can Compile source Flite code. The transformation




Figure 5.1: Type compatibility diagram.
An Flite type checker infers type information from the context of the function
definitions, and explicitly given data type information. It uses standard type
constructors and it is mostly based on Chapters 8 and 9 of [2], extended to handle
case constructors, and algebraic data types. In the diagram the type-checker for
Flite is denoted by FTc. More details of FTc are given in §5.3.
On the right-hand side of the diagram we have the type inference system for Re-
duceron code RTc. It is a type-term equations based system. The type information
is extracted from Reduceron template code. In the presence of recursive calls in
algebraic data types (ADT), the derived equations between type-terms are also
recursive. More of the details are given in §5.4.
Although the two type representations are different in the high-level and low-level
type systems, we wish to demonstrate a compatibility between them. We therefore
translate the high-level types into a low-level representation. In the diagram we
call the translator a Type Compiler.
In order to test whether high-level and low-level types are compatible we supply
to the TyreCheck solver a combined system of equations including the systems
of equations from the two systems. If this combined system of equations can be
solved, the two systems are compatible. In the diagram we denote this test by the
two ways arrow Compatible?. The results and discussions of the compatibility test
are given in §5.7.
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hdt :: = id × −→n × −→Ct




Figure 5.2: High-level type language.
5.3 High Level Types
In Figure 5.2 the type language for Flite includes three main components : types,
type environment and data type definitions. A high-level type ht is either a type
variable hv, or a type constructor C with name id, and a list of types ht which
may be empty.
A type environment hΓ is a list of pairs, each pair contains the function definition
name denoted by id, and its corresponding type ht.
Finally, we have dts which is a list of data type definitions dt. Each data type dt
definition, is a triple containing a name i, a list of arguments denoted by ~n, and a
list of constructors Ct. Each constructor Ct is a pair of id and a list of types ht.
The ids are sorted alphabetically in each dt to preserve the order of the indexes
of the constructors. This order is used by the compiler from Flite to Reduceron
code, so it is essential for compatibility with the sequence of indexes in low-level
types.
The type inference system for Flite provides a type environment and the list of
data types if the program is well-typed.
5.3.1 Examples of Types and Data Type Definitions
A concrete representation for integers is encoded as C "Int" [], a function type
Int applied to zero arguments. A function type is encoded as C "->" [hv1,hv2].
A function type Int → Int is encoded as C "->" [C "Int" [],C "Int" []].
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The encoding of the data type declarations in source language deserves more ex-
planation. Suppose we have two data type definitions for List and Weights as
follows:
• data List a = Cons a (List a) | Nil.
• data Weights a b = Weights a b.
The encoding for List are :
id = “List”, ~n = [a], Ct0 = (“Cons” [a,List a]) and Ct1 = (“Nil”,[ ]). The type for
List has the recursion in the second argument of Cons denoted by (List a).
Similarly for Weights we have : id= “Weights”, ~n= [a,b], and Ct0 = (“Weights”,[a,b]).
5.4 Low-Level Types
In Figure 5.3 the low-level type language contains type-terms denoted by lt. The
type-terms are either a type variable lv, or an integer Int, or a function type
lt → lt, or an open algebraic data type denoted by alg −→ics ext, or a closed algebraic




ics is a list of pairs associating with each
index i of a list of that constructor’s argument types ~lt. Recalling from Chapter 4,
algebraic data types in some cases need to be open to allow any further constructor
components or closed to restrict them. The extension ext in Figure 5.3 is the
information that tells which are the lacks indexes of the alternatives of that data
type. If the data type is closed then no ext information is provided.
Then we define eqn, which contains two terms, the left and the right hand sides
of an equation. The definition sys denotes a list of equations −→eqn. The term-sys
pair is denoted by tsys, it is a convenient way to represent the solutions. Finally
a low-level type environment
−−−−−−→
id× tsys is a list of pairs, and each pair contains a
template index and a term-sys pair tsys, denoting the computed type.
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lt :: = lv | Int | lt → lt | alg −→ics ⊕ ext | alg −→ics
ics :: = i × ~lt
ext :: = lv × ~i
eqn :: = lt × lt
sys :: = −→eqn




Figure 5.3: Low-level type language.
5.5 From High-level to Low-level Types
Now that we know the language for the high-level and low-level types, the first
step towards compatibility is to compile Flite types to low-level types for each
function definition involved in the source code.
When we compile the Flite source code to Reduceron template code, we have three
pieces of information:
1. The data type declarations.
2. The inferred types for each function definition (as given by a high-level type-
checker).
3. The actual template code.
Compilation of high-level types to low-level type-terms and equation systems con-
sists of two phases:
• The compilation of the data type declarations.
• The compilation of the inferred types in each function definition.
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5.5.1 The Compilation of Data Type Declarations
In Figure 5.4 the rule CE compiles the high-level environment lΓ into a low-level
environment hΓ. It takes all the data type definitions denoted by hdt0 . . . hdtn
and gives back the low-level environment < id× tsys > ∪CES. Recall that our
low-level environment is a list of pairs where each pair is a function identifier and
a term-sys pair. Each term-sys pair tsys is compiled by using the data type com-
pilation rule DT . The rule CE is applied recursively to each data type definition,
that is denoted in the definition of CES.
The rule DT translates each high-level algebraic data type definition into a low-
level encoding of the type. It takes as auxiliary argument the current environment
env, the list of all data type definitions ds, and the term variable v for the left
hand side of the first equation. Knowing which term variable is assigned to each
algebraic data type helps us when recursive references occur in constructor type
−→
ct .
The TS rule in Figure 5.4 translates the terms found in each constructor inside a
data type declaration. The rule TS applies the translation rule T in Figure 5.5 to
translate each term in the declarations.
Now in Figure 5.5 we have the rule T . If it is applied to a high-level term variable
v or the Int type it simply returns a pair of that type with an empty list of
equations. Now the interesting part is the translation of constructors. In this rule,
we need to take into account that there are recursive calls in the terms inside of
the constructors. For that reason we use two variables v and v′, we use v′ when we
find recursion in the list of terms in each constructor. To keep our rules simple,
we update the low-level environment when we make a translation. That is why
we use the data type transformation rule DT if a given definition is not in the
environment or the auxiliary function fromEnv which takes a copy of the data
type constructor found in the environment.
In the rule T we don’t have functions as types. Flite source does not have the
ability to use function types in the data type declarations.
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CE < hΓ, v > [[ hdt0...hdtn ]] ⇒ < id , tsys > ∪CES
where
tsys = DT < hΓ, hdt0...hdtn, v > [[ hdt0 ]]






DT < hΓ, hdts, v > [[ (id, ~n,
−→

















ics = (0, t00...t0n)...(m, tm0...tmn)
TS < hΓ, hdts, id, v > [[
−−−→
t0...tn ]] ⇒ tsys0...tsysm
where
tsys0 = T < hΓ, hdts, id, v, v0 > [[ t0 ]]
...
tsysm = T < hΓ, hdts, id, v, vm > [[ tm ]]
Figure 5.4: Translation of data type declarations (I).
T < hΓ, ds, id, v, v′ > [[ v ]]⇒ < v, [ ] >
T < hΓ, ds, id, v, v′ > [[ Int ]]⇒ < Int, [ ] >
T hΓ, ds, id, v, v′ [[ C id′ ts ]]
⇒ < v′, [ ] > if id = id′
⇒ < v′, s0...sn > if id 6= id′ ∧ id′ ∈ ds ∧ v′ ∈ s0...sn
⇒ < v, s0...sn > if id 6= id′ ∧ id′ ∈ ds ∧ v′ 6∈ s0...sn
⇒ < t0, s ∪ s0...sn > if id 6= id′ ∧ id′ 6∈ ds
where (t, s)
= DT < hΓ, ds, hdts >, ifid′ ∈ hΓ
= fromEnv hΓ id′
(t0...sys0)...(tn...sysn) = TS < hΓ, ds, id, v, v
′ >ts
Figure 5.5: Translation of data type declarations (II).
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5.5.2 Compiling Types for Each Function Definition
The type information provided by the Flite type-checker has a list of function top-
level definitions, and their corresponding types. In this section we will see how to
compile such types.
To make use of the C and CS rules in Figure 5.6 for compiling term and a list of
terms, we need first to translate the data type declarations as in §5.5.1 provided
by the Flite type system. By using the low-level environment we can extract
an instance of a given data type when we need it. The general outcome of the
following rules is a tsys tuple formed by a term and a system of term equations.
In Figure 5.6 the rule CS applies the rule C over a list of high-level types. The
rule C, translates a high-level type expression to a pair of term and system of
equations. The first compilation option corresponds to the type variables, when it
occurs then the new term-sys pair is just a new term-type variable, and an empty
system of equations, denoted by < v, [ ] >, where v is a fresh variable name. The
translation for int is straight forward, it becomes a term-type with an empty set of
equations < int, [ ] >. When we want to translate a function denoted by t1 → t2,
we compile recursively each type separately and extract two new term-types t1 and
t2. From the compilation of t1 and t2 we extract also two sets of term equations
sys1 and sys2. Finally we build a functional type and the concatenation of the
two sets of term equations as follows < t′1 → t′2, sys1 ∪ sys2 >. The last part of
the compile rule deals with the data type constructors. It assumes that in the
current environment env the constructor denoted by id already exists. From the
environment env the compiler takes an instance for the constructor name id. Then
it computes the list of type expressions that are in the high-level constructors.
5.6 Examples of Translations.
5.6.1 An Example of Translation for Bool Data Type
Assume we a have a data type definition Bool = False | True. Here id=Bool,
~n=[ ], and Ct0 = (False,[ ]), Ct1 = (True,[ ]) we can translate to a low-level alge-
braic data type as:
alg (0,[ ]) (1,[ ])
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tsys0 = C < hΓ, hdts, v0 > [[ t0 ]]
...
tsysm = C < hΓ, hdts, vm > [[ tm ]]
C < env, ds, v > [[ v ]]⇒ < v′, [ ] >
C < env, ds, v > [[ Int ]]⇒ < Int, [ ] >
C < env, ds, v > [[ t1→ t2 ]]⇒ < t1′ → t2′, sys1 ∪ sys2 >
where
< t1′, sys1 >= C < env, ds, v′ > [[ t1 ]]
< t2′, sys2 >= C < env, ds, v′′ > [[ t2 ]]
v′, v′′ are fresh vars
C < env, ds, v > [[ C id ~t ]]⇒
< t1′, sys1 ∪ (t20 = t20)...(t2n = t2n) ∪ sys20...sys2n >
where
< t1′, sys1 >= instance < id, env >−−−−−−−−−→
< t2, sys2 > = CS < env, ds, v′′′ > [[ ~t ]]
v′′′ is fresh var
Figure 5.6: Compilation rules for types.
In addition, notice in the definition Bool = False — True there are no arguments
for the type Bool, which indicates that there are no polymorphic variables in this
data type.
Each high-level data type definition has a name id, a list of polymorphic variables
denoted by ~n, and a list of pairs (index,constructors) denoted by ~Ct, each con-
structor can be of any type. In order to translate the high-level type, we also need
a list of data type definitions denoted in ds, and the type environment denoted by
env.
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Notice that in the data type definitions we have a complete list of data type
constructors, so we do not allow any type extension. The list of index constructors
ics is extracted from the compilation of each single index constructor.
The two constructors are compiled to obtain ics [(0,[ ]),(1,[ ])], the index zero is
the False constructor, and the one is True constructor. Because there are no
components, the list of components for each constructor is empty.
5.6.2 Example of Type Compatibility of map Function
Our basic method to check if the types are compatible is in three steps:
• Compile high-level types of the map function to low-level term-sys pair.
• From the compiled term-sys (t1, sys1) and inferred term-sys (t2, sys2) equate
t1=t2 and append the two sys parts to the system of equations. We will have
a system of equations as follows: t1 = t2 ∪ sys1 ∪ sys2.
• Solve the system of the equations.
Let us consider the map function in high-level type representation in Figure 5.7, it
is (a → b) → [a] → [b] a function that takes a function from (a → b) as the first
argument, and a list of [a] as its second argument. The result type is [b]. In the
compiled types in Figure 5.7 we have type term and a list of equations. The type
term (a → b) → c → d is the type for (a → b) → [a] → [b]. The types [a] and [b]
are represented by c and d respectively in low-level terms. Now if we look in the
set of equations in the compiled type, we find out that c and d are the left hand
sides of two equations. Those two equations represent the list structures of [a]
and [b]. In this example the high-level type [a] is represented by the low-level type
equation c =(0:[e , c]) + (1:[ ]). That is a recursive equation where the variable c
is in both sides of the equation. And more precisely this recursion occurs in the
component number zero, in its second term-type variable c. The constructor one
contains no term-types constructors. This is the representation of the nil case.
Finally, because we know which are the constructors allowed in this data type
declaration, the lists cannot be extended. The translation of [b] is similar, here [b]
is translated to the equation d=(0:[f ; d]) + (1:[ ]).
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We can see the type of map function inferred by TyreCheck. The representation
is quite close to the compiled version, except that we added an extra equation
to represent a1, that is the first equation in the list of the system of equations
d1= e1 → f1 and some other accumulated equations.
Once we have the compiled types for map function and the inferred types from Re-
duceron, we can follow with the second step, which is equating the two type-terms
and appending the two systems of equations. Equate (a → b) → c → d = a1 → b1 → c1
and append the two systems of equations, see in Figure 5.7 the list of equations
to be solved. Notice the first equation (a → b) → c → d = a1 → b1 → c1 which
is the link to the remaining set of equations.
Once we have the system of equations we solve them to obtain a solution.
The solution for the system of equations includes two sets, the first set is for var
terms assigned to any non-var term. The second set is a var term to var term
assignments. Here, we make explicit the non-extension at the end of the data
types. The extension is denoted by a variable and the list of lack indexes as in
v2[1, 0] for instance.
5.7 Type Compatibility and Discussion
The main goal of this Chapter is to explore the compatibility between Flite types
and Reduceron types. The first attempt to express this type compatibility is
when the two combined systems of equations have at least one solution. This is,
by applying the solver described in Chapter 3 we can decide if the systems of
equations of two different universes are compatible. The idea of the compatibility
is expressed in the diagram in Figure 5.8. From Flite source code we compile to
Reduceron code red, we also infer the type information by using the type-checker
for Flite. From the compilation and type-checking at high-level we obtain top-level
function definitions f with the high-level types denoted by hltypes. Then we use
compileTypes to translate the high-level types to low-level as (f,(t,sys)), where f is
the id of the top-level function definition, and (t,sys) is the tsys pair to represent
the type of the function f and all the possible equations related to that type.
TyreCheck computes the type information as (f’,(t’,sys’)). Finally, the solve func-
tion computes a possible solution for the system of equations obtained from the
Chapter 5. 99
High-level type of map function:
(a→ b)→ [a]→ [b]
Compiled types:
((a→ b)→ c→ d, [ c = (0 : [e; c]) + (1 : [ ])
e = g
d = (0 : [f ; d]) + (1 : [ ])
f = h])
Reduceron types:
(a1 → b1 → c1, [ d1 = e1 → f1
b1 = (0 : [e1; b1]) + (1 : [ ])
g1 = (0 : [f1;h1]) + v2[1, 0]
h1 = (1 : [ ]) + g1[1]
c1 = h1
a1 = d1])
Equations to be solved:
(a→ b)→ c→ d = a1 → b1 → c1
c = (0 : [e; c]) + (1 : [ ])
e = g
d = (0 : [f ; d]) + (1 : [ ])
f = h
d1 = e1 → f1
b1 = (0 : [e1; b1]) + (1 : [ ])
g1 = (0 : [f1;h1]) + v2[1, 0]




d1 = g → f1
g1 = (0 : [f1; d])
c = (0 : [g; c]) + (1 : [ ])
d = (1 : [ ]) + g1[1])
a = g b = f1 e1 = g b1 = c h = f1
h1 = d c1 = d a1 = d1 e = g f = f1
Figure 5.7: Example for type compatibility of the map function.
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Figure 5.8: The actual model for type compatibility.
compilation of high-level types and the low-level types inferred by TyreCheck. In
the diagram it is denoted by the function solve [(t,t’)]+sys+sys’.
We compare the two sets of equations for each function definition type, and if there
exists a solution for them, then the types are compatible. In this validation, we
do not consider the implicit problem of extending or not the algebraic data types
(eg. Sub-typing). The type compatibility between the low-level and high-level
types is a condition to attest that the low-level types are compatible to the types
in the high-level source language. There are some considerations that we must
deal with, for example in the extension in the algebraic data types we allow the
compatibility between more specific and more general types. In some sense when
we talk about algebraic data types, the result type can be more relaxed and the
argument types less relaxed. For instance, in a case expression we can restrict the
number of case alternatives by assigning to them a closed algebraic data type.
5.8 Results
In Table 5.1 we have the results of testing two main properties when we solve the














Table 5.1: Property test over set of programs.
first property tell us if the system has a solution. The second property checks that
once we have a solution, if we apply the substitutions of the solution to the original
systems (the system from the compilation and the system from TyreCheck) we get
the same term and list of term equations, for each top-level function definition.
5.8.1 Type Compatibility Results and Discussion
In Figure 5.9 we have the compiled types and the inferred types for the append
function. We know the type for append is [a] → [a] → [a] at source level. The
types for the low-level encoding are represented by a (t, sys) pair, where t is a
term and sys is a system of equations. Consider the structure of the compiled
data type for the second argument of the append function:
b = (0 : [f ; b])(1 : [ ])
The data type has two constructors, and the constructor type indexed by zero
contains a recursive term b. For this particular case there is less information in
the inferred type. The type for the second argument of append in the inferred
type, k is (0 : [m;n]) + (o, [0])) and by the context k = n the recursive term.
There is no constructor with index one.
In the solution set the equation o = (1 : [ ])) tells us the inferred type is compatible
with the compiled one, as it can be extended to include a nullary constructor with
index one.
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The compiled high-level type (t’,s’) is:
(a→ b→ c , { a = (0 : [d; a])(1 : [ ])
d = e,
b = (0 : [f ; b])(1 : [ ]),
f = g,
c = (0 : [h; c])(1 : [ ]),
h = i})
The inferred low-level type (t,s) is:
(j → k → l , { j = (0 : [m; j])(1 : [ ]),
n = (0 : [m;n]) + (o, [0]),
l = n,
k = n})
The solution demonstrating compatibility is:
{ o = (1 : [ ]), a = (0 : [e; a])(1 : [ ]), b = (0 : [e; b])(1 : [ ])
g = e, j = a, m = e,
c = b, i = e, n = b,
l = b, k = b, d = e,
f = e, h = e}
Figure 5.9: An example of a type compiled from high-level F-lite type and a
type inferred from low-level code, for the append function, along with a solution
showing these two types are compatible.
Often, as in this example, inferred types are more general than compiled ones.
They specify only some constructions but they are open to extension.
As Figure 5.9 illustrates it is typically apparent that there is a similar structure
in both systems of equations. We have similar data types and a similar number
of equations. We point this out because we could have, in one system, a list
of equations containing complex type terms and, in the other system, equations
containing just distinct variables! Of course we can have a solution in that case.
How can we have some confidence that we do not have this case? We can at
least count the number of variables in both systems, and measure the size of the
systems. In Table 5.2 we have a measure for variables, sizes and time to solve
the systems of equations for all top-level function definitions in the benchmark
programs.
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Table 5.2: Measures of the type-equation systems obtained for all top-level
definitions, both by inference from low-level code and by compilation from high-
level types, along with the time needed for the Haskell model of TyreCheck to
verify compatibility.
Number of vars Total size of type-terms
Program
Inferred Compiled Inferred Compiled
Time(s).
Queens 88 54 223 193 0.69
Queens2 196 143 451 499 2.52
MSS 86 67 219 219 0.96
PermSort 79 69 202 206 1.00
OrdList 73 51 173 151 1.64
While 225 158 712 1103 13.32
Sudoku 504 367 1202 1227 31.38
Parts 94 60 237 211 0.96
Braun 147 105 339 322 5.47
Taut 210 105 494 365 4.92
Cichelli 480 490 1164 1678 32.02
5.9 Summary
In this chapter we have shown the compatibility between high-level type informa-
tion and low-level type information. The high-level types are inferred by the Flite
type-checker. The high-level types were compiled to a low-level type representation
in order to be compared with the inferred types by Reduceron TyreCheck.
We have shown the principle of compatibility between high-level and low-level
types, which is given by finding a solution for the combined sets of a system of
equations. We have established the basis for the relation of the low-level and high-
level types. More properties of this correspondence can be explored and justified
in a future work.
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A More Efficient Implementation
6.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we measure the space and time required to apply TyreCheck to
Reduceron code. The speed of the checking is one of our main concerns. In
§6.2 we discuss how space and time costs are significant to our work. Then, we
explain the time and space costs of the Haskell prototype called TyreCheckH , in
§6.3. In §6.4 we give an overview of how we translate the Haskell model to a C
Figure 6.1: Reducing space and time: from a Haskell model to a C implemen-
tation (not to scale).
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implementation, and a description of the main structure of our C implementation
which we call TyreCheckC0 . In §6.6 we measure the efficiency of TyreCheckC0 . In
§6.7 we improve the efficiency of TyreCheckC0 , to obtain TyreCheckC1 . In §6.8
we compare the Haskell model against the two C implementations and discuss
the results. Finally, in §6.9 we present a brief discussion of the benefits of the
implementation.
6.2 Space and Time Costs
As we saw in Chapter 2 one of the main goals of approaches such as proof-checking
code is a minimal trusted computing base [5, 29]. The resources of memory and
time are limited. We aim to provide an efficient way of checking the low-level code
to prevent run-time errors. There are some alternatives to reduce the memory
resources and improve the speed in TyreCheck. We might, for example, follow
the approach of improving the performance in the data structures as in the work
of Okasaki [92], redefining the Haskell data structures in a clever way. Another
possibility is to translate our Haskell prototype to a C implementation. We have
chosen the option of translating to a C version, in part because C provides scope
for further low-level optimisations, and because we can take advantage of other
imperative style properties, for instance, in-place updates of data type structures.
In Figure 6.1 we depict this idea of compressing the time and space of the Haskell
prototype denoted by H. We start by translating to the first version of C implemen-
tation denoted by C0, then we improve the implementation leading to our second
version of the implementation called C1.
6.3 Space and Time of TyreCheckH
Before we commence, we give the size of the programs involved in the experiments
of this Chapter. This will allow us to measure the behaviour of our tools in
different scenarios for scalability testing. Table 6.1 shows the size of each program
in terms of atoms and templates. The programs are in ascending order according
to their number of atoms. In the following sections we will see how the time and
space costs vary according to the number of atoms and the number of templates
in a given program.
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Table 6.1: Number of atoms and templates in programs involved in experi-













Table 6.2 gives us a general idea of the amount of memory allocated and time
needed to infer the type information using the Haskell prototype. On average the
allocated memory is 4Gb and the runtime is around 3.5 seconds. If we remove
Sudoku from the experiments the average is considerably reduced to 2 Gb and 1.5
seconds respectively. According to Table 6.1 the number of atoms in Sudoku is
more than four times the average number of atoms in the rest of the programs
(which is 210), and the number of templates is almost four times the average
numbers of templates in the other programs (44). We can ask the question: Is
there any relation between the number of atoms or templates in the code for a
program and the space-time used to compute the type information in the given
set of programs?
In Figure 6.2 we have a graphical representation for the growth of space and
time compared to atoms (a) and (b), templates in (c) and (d), number of atomic
applications in (e) and (f), and the sum of atoms for functions, case tables, and
constructors in (g) and (h).
In (a) and (b), we expected to see a pattern where the space and time increases
when the number of atoms increases. But the variety of kinds of atoms makes this
model too simple. Similarly in (c) and (d), we find that the number of templates
is not a good predictor of space and time costs. One reason is because we can
find empty templates (eg. consider the empty branch of a head function) or single
atom templates.
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Table 6.2: Summary of total allocated memory and time for Haskell prototype.












Another alternative is to count the number of applications in each program. In (e)
and (f), there is a closer correspondence between the number of applications and
the space and time used. However, there still some inconsistencies. If we observe
the plots (a) to (f) we can discard (c) and (d), the measures for templates. If
the atoms and the applications are the hint, one possibility is only to take into
account the most complex atoms. That is the atoms for functions, case tables and
constructors. In Figure (g) and (h) we can see that the number of atoms of this
kind is quite a good predictor of checking costs. Here we only take into account
FUN, TAB and CON atoms in each program for the following reasons :
• The FUN atoms for functions are most often applied to some arguments,
then, the presence of one atom FUN i j implies that there are possibly i
atoms for arguments. Moreover, every time a function is called TyreCheck
creates an instance or copy of the function type.
• The TAB atoms for case tables are similar, and more expensive in terms
of memory. For instance the atom TAB i j k requires TyreCheck to copy
the types for the templates at index position i to i+j. In addition, it must
deal with any additional atoms after the TAB atom, representing the free
variables denoted by k.
• The atom CON i j is a constructor of arity i and index j. The algebraic data
types are related to this constructor. These atoms are very often applied to
some i arguments.
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The reason that atoms for primitives, pointers, literals and function arguments
(PRI, PTR, INT and ARG) do not influence TyreCheck costs so much is that
many of them are eliminated during PrimCheck analysis, some arguments become
integer blocks, and some pointers are inlined. —See §4.3.
6.3.1 Profiling the Haskell Prototype
We shall now look more closely at time and space costs when we apply TyreCheckH
to Reduceron code. The ghc compiler provides a mechanism to extract informa-
tion about memory and time, and the ghc profiler [93, 94] collects the statistics.
For now we execute the profiler for TyreCheckH applied to Queens, Braun, and
Sudoku programs. From Table 6.1 we see that Queens has 157 atoms and 30 tem-
plates, Braun has 229 atoms and 72 templates, and Sudoku has 894 atoms and
143 templates.
Figure 6.3 shows which TyreCheck functions consume most memory and time
when we check the Queens code. In the Table the column COST CENTRE denotes
the column for the name of the function. There are three functions that consume
more than 83% of the time, and more than 84% of memory, these functions are:
• Function freshvar in module Vars and TermOperations, provide us a fresh
term-type variables during type-checking. For the Haskell model we use
a brute force style to obtain the next fresh variable. We traverse all the
structures from the environment and the systems of equations to obtain
a new fresh variable. In the C implementation we eliminate this memory
consumption by using a global variable which gives us the next fresh variable
without using the brute force solution used in Haskell prototype.
• Function addDeclEnv.unkndefns in module Environment, calculates which
variables are generic in an environment. This operation is costly because it
has to order the list of variables during its computation.
• Function vars in module Terms, collects a list of all the variables in a term-
type expression. The accumulation of the lists is a big issue. These var
lists in some cases must be in some order. With this restriction we compute
expensive data structures over lists.
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Figure 6.2: Code measures plotted against space and time costs.
(a) (b)




























































































COST CENTRE MODULE %time %alloc
freshvar Vars 28.1 52.9
addDeclEnv.unkndefns Environment 20.6 1.2
vars Terms 14.6 15.7
freshvar TermOperations 7.4 7.1
freshvar Vars 6.8 0.0
freshvar Vars 6.5 5.8
unknownsScheme Environment 3.2 7.3
vars.\ Terms 2.1 2.1
unknownsScheme.varsin Environment 1.4 0.6
val Environment 1.3 0.1
check Main 1.1 0.4
vars Terms 0.9 1.7
readPrec Syntax 0.8 1.3
Figure 6.3: GHC time and allocation report for TyreCheckH for the program
Queens.
What happens when we profile bigger programs like Braun and Sudoku? In Figures
6.4 and 6.5 the results are similar to the ones we obtained for Queens. The main
functions taking almost all time and space are the same as in previous example.
Additionally from the information in tables, we see that time used in computing
the type information for Braun is 9 times the time used to compute the type
information of Queens. And Sudoku takes more than 9 times the time of Braun.
The most expensive functions remain the same here when we compute the type
information for Sudoku. Notice the freshvar function in the three tables, it
consumes more than 50% of memory in all the cases. The second most expensive
function in terms of memory is the function vars. It collects the variable set for a
term-type. In some cases, the name of the functions in column COST CENTRE are
duplicated. For instance, the cost center vars belongs to a top level function, and
vars.\ belongs to a where clause in a function definition.
6.4 From TyreCheckH to TyreCheckC model
As a general rule, there is one module in the C implementation for each module in
Haskell, one top level C function definition corresponds to a Haskell definition when
possible, and there is a correspondence one-to-one for each data type structure.
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COST CENTRE MODULE %time %alloc
addDeclEnv.unkndefns Environment 36.6 1.3
freshvar Vars 23.1 52.4
vars Terms 10.1 15.3
freshvar TermOperations 6.3 7.2
freshvar Vars 5.2 5.7
unknownsScheme Environment 4.3 9.9
freshvar Vars 4.1 0.0
val Environment 2.3 0.1
vars.\ Terms 1.7 1.8
unknownsScheme.varsin Environment 1.6 0.7
vars Terms 0.8 1.8
vars Terms 0.5 1.0
Figure 6.4: GHC time and allocation report for TyreCheckH for the program
Braun.
COST CENTRE MODULE %time %alloc
addDeclEnv.unkndefns Environment 40.7 0.7
freshvar Vars 22.1 56.4
vars Terms 9.9 16.4
freshvar TermOperations 6.3 7.9
freshvar Vars 5.6 6.3
freshvar Vars 4.8 0.0
unknownsScheme Environment 2.3 5.9
vars.\ Terms 2.3 3.0
val Environment 2.3 0.0
vars Terms 0.5 1.1
Figure 6.5: GHC time and allocation report for TyreCheckH for the program
Sudoku.
The different stages of checking Reduceron code are, AtomCheck, PrimCheck, and
then TyreCheck. To explain the initial translation from Haskell to C, we give first,
the translation approach for template code. Then we give a brief explanation of
the other data structures used in the C implementation of TyreCheck.
6.4.1 Template Translation Overview
The structures in template code include, the structure of the atoms, applications
and templates. For PrimCheck we also need split templates. We follow the
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data Atom = ARG Int | PTR Int | INT Int | PRI String
| FUN Int Int | CON Int Int | TAB Int Int Int
| BOOL | PRIM Int BOOL
Figure 6.6: Representing atoms in Haskell.
same pattern as in the Haskell prototype to represent the data structures in the C
language implementation. For example, in Figure 6.7 we give the C translation of
the Haskell declaration of the Atom data type in Figure 6.6. In general, we encode
algebraic data types in Haskell as tagged unions in struct data type definitions.
We can find an explanation how data types in Haskell can be translated to an
imperative style in Appendix A of [95].
struct atom{






struct {int arity; int index;} fun;
struct {int arity; int index;} con;
struct {int index; int alts; int fvs;} tab;
int bool;
struct {int arity;int isBoolRes;} prim;
};
};
typedef struct priname *PName;
struct priname{
enum {Add, Sub, Leq, Equ, Dif, Emit, EmitInt} name;
};
Figure 6.7: Representing atoms in C.
Now that we have the definition for atom translation, to represent applications in
C we need to encode Haskell lists. At first we use a translation really close to our
Haskell prototype, defining a head : tail structure by using linked lists in our
C implementation. Figure 6.8 give us the definition for a linked list representing
a list of atoms. This is, a struct called atomCons, which has two components, the
head of the list denoted headAtom, which is a pointer to a struct atom previously
defined in Figure 6.7. The second component of the structure struct atomCons
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typedef struct atom *Atom;





Figure 6.8: Atom lists in C.
Atom mkARG(int v){





AtomList mkAtomCons(Atom a, AtomList as){





Figure 6.9: Memory allocation constructors for atoms.
is the tail of the atom list, a recursive call to the linked list, this is encoded as
AtomList tailAtoms. The empty list is represented by a NULL pointer.
To create an atom or a list of atoms, we have definitions such as those in Figure
6.9.
Finally, recall that the template code is represented in Haskell as in Figure 6.10.
A program is a list of templates, and each template is a triple composed of arity,
a list of atoms, and a list of list of atoms. The C translation is given in Figure
6.11.
The definitions given here are only illustrative examples of how we make the
translation.
In Haskell the functionality for parsing and printing data structures is free. This
is not the case in C but the techniques for parsing and pretty printing are straight-
forward and will not be discussed here.
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type Arity = Int
type Template = (Arity,[Atom],[[Atom]])
type Prog = [Template]
Figure 6.10: Haskell template declaration.
typedef struct tplate *Template;
typedef struct templateCons *TemplateList;














Figure 6.11: Template definition in C.
6.4.2 Term-Types Translation Overview
Figure 6.12 follows the same approach of translating type-terms as we did in
translating templates. The struct term gives us the support to work with type-
term functions, type term variables, algebraic data types and numeric literals.
6.4.3 Remarks on C Data Structures
Beyond the representation of the terms, it is important to explain some consid-
erations. Sometimes we can take advantage of in-place updates in imperative
structures or loops instead of recursion. The data structures in Haskell are persis-
tent, but in many cases their use is single threaded, in a C implementation we can
Chapter 6. 115
typedef struct term *Term;
typedef struct termCons *TermList;
typedef struct ics *Ics;
typedef struct icsCons *IcsList;
typedef struct ext *Ext;
typedef int Id;
typedef struct idCons *IdList;
struct term {
enum {isFunT, isVar , isAlg, isNum} tag;
union {
struct {Term arg; Term res;} fun;
int var;




Figure 6.12: An illustrative example of type-term in C.
Eqn drawEqnFor(int v, Sys s)
{
EqnList *esref = &(s->eqnList);
while (*esref) {
Eqn e = (*esref)->headEqn;








Figure 6.13: The drawEqnFor function removes in-place any assignment
found.
update in place. The system of equations used in the solver is a good example.
The C version of the function drawEqnFor in Figure 6.13, destructively removes
one equation from a system of equations stored in a linked list.
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Figure 6.14: Interpretation diagram of compatibility results.
6.5 Correspondence Results
In this section we discuss the way to check the correspondence between the Pro-
totype Checker implemented in Haskell and the checker implemented in C. Our
empirical method is to mutate the programs of our benchmark, then we apply
TyreCheckH and TyreCheckC to a large number of randomly generated mutants.
If the results are the same for each mutant, then we have strong evidence of cor-
respondence between the Haskell prototype and the C implementation.
From the set of programs presented in Table 6.1 in §6.3, we have executed the
Haskell prototype and the C implementation against a set of mutations. The
results are that in 99% of cases results are the same.
Some improvements in code produced the effect depicted In Figure 6.14. The ideal
results are denoted by circle called Ideal; that means that all the OK programs are
the same in the prototype and in the implementation, and all well-typed programs
are the same in the implementation and in the prototype.
In the Actual circle we see the behaviour and that means that sometimes the
programs stopped by the C implementation are not stopped by the Haskell proto-
type, or vice-versa. The C implementation is denoted by the dotted lines and the
Chapter 6. 117
template alternative of arity n : (n,[...],[...])
functional type in general : a0 → ... → an
functional type for template alternative of arity 2 : a0 → a1 → a2
functional type in detail : a0 → ... an → t → fv0 → ... → fvn → r
Figure 6.15: Illustrative example to assign functional types based on the arity.
# of Template
1 (_,[... TAB 2 2 3,ARG 0],[...])
2 (2,[...],[..])
3 (2,[...],[..])
Figure 6.16: An small example of TAB constructor and its related alternatives.
Haskell prototype with the continuous line.
6.5.1 Discussion
During the translation from the model to the implementation, we found some
problems in the prototype that were detected by the actual implementation.
As an illustrative example of such problems, let us consider the problem when we
want to extract an element of a given list by using the standard Haskell functions
drop and take. The analysis of the TAB i j k constructor is the one that deserves
more care. This constructor has the following information: i is the index of the
first alternative, j is the number of alternatives to be considered, and k is the
number of free variables.
The functional type-term of an alternative is based in the arity of the template.
In Figure 6.15, the template has arity n, and the functional type for this template
is denoted as a0 →...→ an, where a0 is the first argument type and an is the type
result. For instance, if we have a template of arity two the functional type-term is
a0 → a1 → a2. But, if this functional type represents a case alternative, we need
to distinguish the term-variables that are before the untouchable table argument,
and the variables after this table argument.
In Figure 6.16, we have that in template number one, the TAB constructor refers to
the second template as the first alternative, and the last alternative is the template
number three. The number of free variables for this table is one, as encoded in
the TAB atom.
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For example let us suppose we have in the second template vars = [a,b,c]. The
formula to know how many variables we want to take from the alternative is :
arity - number of free vars - 1. In this example this is 2-3-1=-2. If we want to
take a negative number of elements from a list, we obtain a valid result. Here,
the application take -2 [a,b,c] is equals to an empty list [ ]. This error was
trapped during the translation to C, and was undetected in the Haskell prototype
due to the nature of the definition of take function in Haskell. A similar problem
occurs when we try to drop elements of a given list, and the number of elements
is negative.
The discussion presented in this section points out the benefit of this approach to
build programs. We were able to make several small improvements to the Haskell
prototype based on comparative testing against our C implementation.
6.6 Time and Space Costs of TyreCheckC0
6.6.1 Time
One of our main objectives is to reduce the amount of resources used by the
checking tools. We would like checking techniques to be applicable even in small
devices and without delaying execution unduly. The machinery to check if the code
is well-behaved must be faster and less complex than the machinery to produce
the code, eg. a compiler.
We apply the profiling tools to our first C implementation to examine runtime
costs. In Tables 6.17 and 6.18 we present the main time measurements for Queens
and Braun programs. We executed TyreCheckC0 100 times to emulate a sufficient
number of profiling sample points to give a good estimate of which functions are
the expensive ones. The 10 most costly functions consume more than 90% of time.
The meanings of the columns are as follows :
• time The percentage of the total execution time spent in this function.
• cumulative seconds The cumulative total number of seconds the computer
spent executing this functions, plus the time spent in all the functions above
this one in this table.
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% cumulative self
time seconds seconds calls name
36.53 4.84 4.84 7180700 findId
30.19 8.84 4.00 8798700 concatVars
13.51 10.63 1.79 9860700 appendVars
10.23 11.99 1.36 25618700 findEqnFor
1.66 12.21 0.22 25054300 substInTerm
1.13 12.36 0.15 6113800 vars
0.72 12.45 0.10 187300 drawEqnFor
0.60 12.53 0.08 9860700 mkIds
0.49 12.60 0.07 19360770 emalloc
0.45 12.66 0.06 125600 varsEqs
Figure 6.17: Profile time for the 10 most costly functions when checking
Queens executed 100 times using implementation TyreCheckC0.
• self seconds The number of seconds accounted for by this function alone.
• calls The total number of times the function was called.
• name This is the name of the function.
In Table 6.17 we can see that function findId, concatVars, and appendVars are
the three most expensive functions. In the Haskell prototype we can observe a
similar behaviour in Figure 6.3 in §6.3. The first function lookup for an element in
a given list of ints. The functions concatVars and appendVars collect variables
in a list of terms, they preserve the order of the elements in the list. The function
findId is used to find ids, for example in the solver when it computes lacks
information. The functions to concatenate and append variables, are expensive
because they traverses all the list, in order to attach in the tail the next list or
element. Sometimes the big list is the one which is traversed. The order of the
elements in a list sometimes is useful during type-checking. For instance consider
when we need to determine which variables are free variables, which are the ones
for the table argument and which the result type and the arguments in a case
alternative.
The fourth most expensive function is findEqnFor which is only used by the solver.
In Table 6.18 we can see that the first ten functions are the almost the first ten
functions in Table 6.17. Notice that the five most costly functions consumes more
than 90% in of the execution time.
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% cumulative self
time seconds seconds calls name
47.74 18.55 18.55 22640600 findId
22.52 27.30 8.75 27602500 concatVars
13.31 32.48 5.17 29195800 appendVars
5.62 34.66 2.19 76105400 findEqnFor
2.47 35.62 0.96 74330600 substInTerm
1.03 36.02 0.40 17582000 vars
0.98 36.40 0.38 4534800 idElem
0.71 36.68 0.28 36596500 substInEqn
0.68 36.94 0.27 275800 drawEqnFor
0.62 37.18 0.24 316100 substInSys
Figure 6.18: Profile time for the 10 most costly functions when checking Braun
executed 100 times using implementation TyreCheckC0.
In Tables 6.17 and 6.18 have detected which functions consumes the most time,
and how they are called.
6.6.2 Space
In previous section we explored the time costs of TyreCheckC0, here now we discuss
the memory usage when we apply TyreCheckC0 to Queens and Braun programs.
By instrumenting every point the code where we allocate memory, we can extract
which functions are using the most memory, and the total amount of memory
allocated.
In Table 6.3 we present the 10 most expensive functions and the total amount
of memory used when we compute the type information for Queens and Braun
programs respectively. In both programs the functions presented in Table 6.3 use
more than 94% of the overall memory used in each program. Here again, the
functions related to ids are involved. For instance, the function mkId is used to
build lists with ordered elements. The function mkVar is used to create vars in
functions related to lists of vars, like appendVars or concatVars.
Recall in the previous §6.3 where we investigated the memory usage for TyreCheckH
. In Table 6.3 we can see that the amount of allocated memory used by Queens
is 518.25 Mb. Compared to the amount of memory for TyreCheckC0 applied to
Queens (in Table 6.6) that amount is 2.58 Mb. The amount of allocated memory
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Table 6.3: Percentage of memory for the 10 most expensive functions used
when checking Queens and Braun using TyreCheckC0.
% of memory Function % of memory Function
Queens Braun
45.09 mkIds 56.52 mkIds
26.98 mkVar 19.68 mkVar
8.25 mkEqnCons 5.04 mkEqnCons
6.83 mkEqn 4.19 mkEqn
3.06 mkFun 3.83 mkFun
0.96 mkAlg 1.84 mkEnv
0.90 mkTermCons 0.92 mkTermSys
0.77 mkEnv 0.88 mkScheme
0.77 mkIcsCons 0.86 mkAlg
0.75 mkIcs 0.85 mkIdCons
94.36% of the total memory used(2.58 Mb) in Queens.
94.60% of the total memory used(6.99 Mb) in Braun.
in Haskell prototype is 265 times bigger than the memory used in C implementa-
tion for Queens. Similarly, for the experiments when we apply TyreCheckH and
TyreCheckC0 to Braun, the amount of memory in Haskell prototype is 307 times
the amount used in C implementation. Figure 6.19 shows the gain in space and
time when we translate the Haskell prototype to a C implementation.
6.7 Space and Time of TyreCheckC1
6.7.1 Time of TyreCheckC1
From the observation in the data in preliminary sections Haskell prototype and
the C implementation, we can conclude that functions involving lists of variables
or a list of ids are the most used. Some of them are part of the solver based on the
work of Colmerauer [19]. We can tackle the problem by using an efficient approach
to solve infinite trees as in [96, 97], in which the searching of an equation during
the substitution is performed in constant time.
In our first implementation in C, we emulate the list approach in Haskell, by using
linked list in C. One advantage of this approach is that we follow the Haskell
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Figure 6.19: Comparative for space and time of TyreCheckC0 and
TyreCheckH.
% cumulative self
time seconds seconds calls name
54.70 2.39 2.39 7180700 findId
20.25 3.28 0.89 25618700 findEqnFor
6.18 3.55 0.27 555300 appendVars
5.26 3.78 0.23 25054300 substInTerm
1.60 3.85 0.07 6109000 vars
1.37 3.91 0.06 81000 nubIdList
0.92 3.95 0.04 949200 idElem
0.80 3.98 0.04 19382270 emalloc
0.80 4.02 0.04 8127400 fromVar
0.69 4.05 0.03 7753500 mkIds
Figure 6.20: Profile time for the 10 most costly functions when checking
Queens executed 100 times using implementation TyreCheckC1.
prototype. The drawback of the linked-lists approach is that the operation of
searching and updating in a lists is expensive. One possible way to reduce the
time in searching to a constant time, is by using arrays.
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% cumulative self
time seconds seconds calls name
60.38 10.19 10.19 22640600 findId
13.95 12.55 2.36 76105400 findEqnFor
5.04 13.40 0.85 74330600 substInTerm
3.79 14.04 0.64 1248300 appendVars
1.78 14.34 0.30 4534800 idElem
1.72 14.63 0.29 17569600 vars
1.24 14.84 0.21 936000 appendEnv
1.07 15.02 0.18 316100 substInSys
1.07 15.20 0.18 439200 nubIdList
1.04 15.37 0.18 275800 drawEqnFor
Figure 6.21: Profile time for the 10 most costly functions when checking Braun
executed 100 times using implementation TyreCheckC1.
Figure 6.22: Comparative for space and time of TyreCheckC1,TyreCheckC0
and TyreCheckH.
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Table 6.4: Percentage of memory for the 10 most expensive functions used
when checking Queens and Braun using TyreCheckC1.
% of memory Function % of memory Function
Queens Braun
35.42 mkIds 44.19 mkIds
26.95 mkVar 19.65 mkVar
10.33 mkIdCons 13.13 mkIdCons
8.24 mkEqnCons 5.04 mkEqnCons
6.83 mkEqn 4.19 mkEqn
3.06 mkFun 3.82 mkFun
0.96 mkAlg 1.84 mkEnv
0.90 mkTermCons 0.92 mkTermSys
0.77 mkEnv 0.88 mkScheme
0.77 mkIcsCons 0.86 mkAlg
94.21% of the total memory used (2.57 Mb) in Queens.
94.51% of the total memory used (6.98 Mb) in Braun.
6.7.2 Space of TyreCheckC1
Even if we have sped up the time, we still have the same memory usage. In
Table 6.4 we have the functions consuming more than 94% of the total amount
of used memory. In Figure 6.22 we can notice the reduction in time. The second
C implementation is about 2× times faster than the first C implementation in
the big programs. The memory used still almost the same, we can see it in the
graphical representation of Figure 6.22.
Differences between TyreCheckC0 and TyreCheckC1. The implementa-
tion TyreCheckC1 differs from TyreCheckC0 in the following:
TyreCheckC1 uses a clever way when concatenate or append lists of term variables.
Instead of traversing the bigger list and adding it at the end the small list. We
solve this problem by the use of continuation lists to avoid append applications.
This operations on lists are performed when the elements of the accumulated list
do not need to be in specific order.
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6.8 Comparative Performance
Execution time We first present and discuss a comparison of execution times
between the two C implementations and the Haskell model. The testing was
performed using the -O2 optimisation flag in ghc and gcc compilers.
In Table 6.5 we see the reduction in execution time from the model TyreCheckH
to the implementation TyreCheckC0. This gain is about 10×, except for the
programs While and Sudoku, in which we only have a reduction in speed of about
3× to 4×. The reduction in execution time from TyreCheckH to TyreCheckC0 is in
part because in the C implementation we use a counter to generate fresh variables.
In Haskell version we use a brute force method to determine a fresh variable.
The programs Sudoku and While demand more work in functions to extract term
variables from the environment. Every time we have a new solution for a connected
group, in the Haskell version we store only the needed variables and then we store
them into the environment. In TyreCheckC0 we decided to omit this step of
filtering needed variables, so the number of equations stored in the environment
for each top-level function definition is bigger in the C implementation. The added
cost becomes significant in programs where more complex structures are stored in
the environment as for Sudoku and While.
When we use the TyreCheckC1 implementation, we see that for all but the smallest
programs it is about 2×–3× faster than the TyreCheckC0 implementation. The
time needed to compute the type information in bigger programs is less than a
second in the case of While (441 atoms, 61 templates) and Cichelli (698 atoms,
146 templates), and less than three seconds for Sudoku (894 atoms, 143 templates).
Memory allocation In Table 6.6 we have a comparison of memory allocation
for the two C implementations and the Haskell model. The memory allocation is
reduced by a factor of 200× to 350× when we use TyreCheckC0 instead of the
model TyreCheckH. This saving is mainly due to the use of in-place update of the
major single threaded data structures in the C implementation.
For TyreCheckC1 there is no further reduction in allocated memory in comparison
with TyreCheckC0. The use of continuation lists in append applications avoids
the cost of traversing the first append argument, but as append in TyreCheckC0
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Table 6.5: Summary of time in seconds for the Haskell model and the C
implementations.
Program TyreCheckH TyreCheckC0 TyreCheckC1
Parts 0.35 0.03 0.02
Queens 0.39 0.03 0.03
MSS 0.55 0.04 0.04
PermSort 0.58 0.03 0.02
OrdList 0.65 0.08 0.04
Queens2 1.93 0.26 0.11
Braun 2.26 0.12 0.08
Taut 2.91 0.26 0.11
While 7.23 2.94 0.99
Sudoku 26.55 6.05 2.74
Cichelli 31.42 2.23 0.87
Table 6.6: Summary of allocated memory in MB for the Haskell model and
the C implementations.
Program TyreCheckH TyreCheckC0 TyreCheckC1
Parts 476.32 2.66 2.66
Queens 518.25 2.58 2.57
MSS 676.24 2.88 2.87
PermSort 761.37 3.07 3.06
OrdList 950.80 3.65 3.64
Queens2 1848.27 7.44 7.44
Braun 2209.60 6.99 6.98
Taut 2987.75 10.14 10.13
While 8129.82 25.53 25.52
Cichelli 15325.84 38.94 38.92
Sudoku 19970.88 59.07 59.05
already uses destructive update no further reduction in allocated memory is pos-
sible.
A Really Fast Implementation From the experiments reported in this sec-
tion, we can see that the execution time needed to check bigger programs using
TyreCheckC1 is still 1-3 secs. To have a really fast implementation we would need
to change the representation of some heavily used data structures. For instance,
at some points the solver needs to look for an equation with a specific variable on
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the left. The access to any such equation could be achieved in constant time if
we used an array structure with variables as indices. In order to know how much
memory we need to allocate such arrays, we can simply count the number of type
variables.
In our experiments in this thesis, the representation for the Reduceron code uses
linked date structures. However, the actual machine executes Reduceron template
code represented as a blocks of bytes. So this represents another opportunity for
optimisation, the template code could also be represented with indexed addressing
to have the benefits of constant time access.
6.9 Summary
In this Chapter we have shown how to reduce the space and time costs of TyreCheck.
The main benefit of having a small and fast checker is to provide an efficient way
of checking Reduceron code without relying too much on the computational power
of the target machine where our static methods are applied.
We started with a Haskell prototype, which served as a basis for implementations
in C. Then in the first stage We build TyreCheckC0 implementation and mea-
sure it. We extracted information about where the time is going and how much
memory is used in each program allocation point. In TyreCheckC1, the second C
implementation we have a good gain in the performance. We have reduced the
memory from TyreCheckH to TyreCheckC0 300× in average for test programs. In
the second version, for TyreCheckC0 to TyreCheckC1 we have a gain in speed is
about 2×.
Further optimisations might lead to better results than the ones presented here.
A further analysis of the data structures used in the implementation is a good
start. For instance, to reduce the amount of memory and increase the speed we
can calculate the maximum number of allocated variables in all the programs.
Once we have that information, we can change the data structure representation
to arrays. With that number of the possible allocated variables, we can allocate
memory for the entire array of variables. By using arrays we can access the type-
term variables in constant time, those variables are references to other type of
term-types structures like functions or algebraic data types. Another benefit of
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having arrays, is that we can manipulate the memory possibly in blocks of memory
or blocks of related variables.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis has explored and discussed type-checking methods applied to low-level
code. In Chapter 4 we developed type-checking methods to check statically low-
level code. In Chapter 5 types derived from low-level code were shown compatible
with types inferred from the high-level source program. Chapter 6 showed the first
steps towards efficient static checkers.
In Chapter 2 we presented a literature review of some related work, noting con-
nections between what we explore in this thesis and what has been reported in
the literature. The whole area of static checking is big, we haven’t discussed all
the techniques in our work. In our work we have focussed more on lightweight
static checking techniques, particularly those related to type-checking and type-
inference.
The main contribution of Chapter 3 is the machinery to test our prototypes and
implementations. The main idea is based on mutations. The mutation of programs
gives us a convenient way to create programs very close to a compiled and well-
behaved program. We combine mutation with the random selection of the mutated
candidate.
In Chapter 4 we proposed a method based on type equations to infer type infor-
mation from low-level code. In addition, we have evaluated the effectiveness of
the static checking techniques by empirical work – see §4.5. We have used the
mutation technique to generate mutants based on a well-behaved program.
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Also in Chapter 4 we proposed a method to eliminate the primitive applications in
a preliminary checking stage called PrimCheck , see §4.3. Instead of dealing with
dependent types, we reduce and isolate the problem. We measure the effectiveness
of the primitive checking alone by using mutations. The advantage of PrimCheck
is that we can stop bad programs before type-checking them with fewer resources
in terms of computation steps and memory usage.
In Chapter 5 we provided evidence of compatibility between the type inference
system for a high-level and the one used by the checkers working on low-level
code. We showed how to translate high-level types to low-level type-terms, then
we can compare or solve the two systems of equations. The initial idea is if we can
find a joint solution then there is a compatibility between the two type systems.
We also check some other properties relating solutions of the two systems.
The final part of this thesis is about the time and space costs of our static checker.
In Chapter 6, we created a C version of the Haskell prototype to make more ef-
ficient static checker, in terms of memory consumption and execution time. The
first part is concerned about the correspondence between the Haskell prototype
and the C implementation. Some updates over the structures are performed in
place rather than producing a new structure as it is in functional programming
languages. The second part is more related to the efficiency of the C implemen-
tation. We have measured and detected the most costly parts of the code. A
systematic transformation eliminates some of the most costly list processing, and
this transformation alone yields a 3× speed up.
7.2 Discussion
The importance of the checking low-level code is essential in a connected world.
The compiled code may be sent over an unreliable channel, and could be altered
to produce an unexpected behaviour in the host machine. The need to patch
compiled code in a running system is part of the reality in the software industry.
We have experimented with the combination of functional languages and type-
checking techniques to create a prototype, and then implemented a checker in C
language to check Reduceron code statically.
The advantage of the static checking techniques presented in our work is significant,
because we do not need complex machinery such as theorem provers. No extra
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load is placed on the programmer or on the compiler. The programmer does not
need to learn how to use a theorem prover or install new features into the compiler.
The compiler does not need to be adapted to a theorem prover. We have provided
a mechanism to check statically low-level untyped code.
7.3 Future Work
The work could be developed further in several directions. Possible lines of future
work include :
• By adding a small amount of code annotation the effectiveness of the static
checking might be improved. Even if most ill-behaved programs can be
trapped by the static analysis, and most well-behaved programs accepted,
by adding some extra information the effectiveness might be improved. This
extra information is not just type information, some other properties can
be useful to help in the stopping of ill-behaved programs and allowing more
well-behaved programs. Some related work on annotating programs is found
in [13–15]. A combination of type-checking and property checking by adding
annotations as in [16], could provide a more powerful mechanism to stop
ill-behaved programs.
• In the case of adding a new component, checking would ideally be applied
only to the specific component, avoiding the extra cost and complexity of
whole-program checking.
This static checking mechanism could be applied to a part of whole program.
In the same spirit of functional programming with a strong type system,
we could use the type information to check if the new component is type
compatible with the existing type information in the context.
• We have not investigated the properties of the mutation test, this is a whole
area and we have taken only the basic principles for our experimental work.
We think this model of testing is general enough to be used in other experi-
ments.
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